

# The 2008 Presidential Election in Ohio: An Historical & Analytical Perspective Plus a Prediction

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


Figure 4: Presidential Vote in Ohio, 1988 to 2004

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## Introduction

As the 2008 presidential election enters the final stretch, Ohio is one of a dozen difficult-to-predict battleground states.<sup>1</sup> Whether the national result will turn, as it did in 2004, on what Buckeye State voters decide is anyone's guess at this point in the campaign given that there are so many closely contested states that could tip the election this November.\*

Still, two facts have conspired to keep plenty of attention on our state.

First, everyone understands that no Republican has ever been elected president without carrying Ohio, a truism that has only been critical in the close elections won—or lost—by the GOP's national standard-bearer.

Second, the historic 2006 election in Ohio witnessed a remarkable Democratic party comeback after a generation of Republican dominance in the state. The forces that fueled the amazing 2006 Ohio Democratic victories for governor and U.S. senator are as strong today as they were two years ago, perhaps even stronger.

So, with a month and a half to go to Election Day, who is likely to carry Ohio's twenty electoral votes and, as a result, in a close election nationwide, win the presidency: Senator Barack Obama of Illinois, the Democratic party nominee, or Senator John McCain of Arizona, the Republican party nominee?

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\* This paper draws from and builds on my concluding chapter, "Ohio Politics in the Twenty-First Century," in Alexander P. Lamis and Brian Usher, eds., *Ohio Politics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2007), 500-539 [Chapter 21].

Before answering that question, it is wise to examine past Ohio election trends as well as to analyze notable past transformations of the national party system and Ohio's role in those changes. In other words, exploring Ohio electoral politics within the broader national context provides an indispensable framework for understanding how Ohio is likely to vote on November 4.

## **A Century of Ohio & National Electoral Change**

To begin, three party strength figures offer a reasonably precise roadmap for our journey through time and space. They chart Democratic party strength from 1872 through 2006, first, in Ohio (Figure 1) and, then, in the northern states (Figure 2) and in the American South (Figure 3). Encapsulated in the twists and turns of these figures is a great deal of Ohio and American political history. **[Note: All twelve tables and seven figures referred to in this research paper are located at the end of the text and before the endnotes, except for Figure 4, the revealing, five-election, county-level Ohio map, which is displayed on the paper's title page.]**

The solid line in the figures measures Democratic strength using a composite of the Democratic party vote percentages for three key offices--governor, U.S. senator, and U.S. representative. The measure, devised by Prof. Paul T. David of the University of Virginia and appropriately called David's index,<sup>2</sup> is calculated every two years with each office counting a third.<sup>3</sup> In the figures, David's index is plotted along with the Democratic vote for president (the dotted line), permitting the separation of the quadrennial presidential vote from the far more complex process of overall partisan change. Incidentally, the figures could be presented from the Republican perspective, which would show roughly a flip-side picture; thus, when Democrats are

down, Republicans are up, and vice versa. The decision to go with the Democratic perspective was arbitrary.<sup>4</sup>

Making sense of the ups-and-downs portrayed in these figures requires, first, exploring the fascinating field of American electoral and party system change and, then, applying the lessons of that exploration to the Ohio experience.

The central concept political scientists use in the study of electoral change is “realignment.” In an influential 1955 article, Professor V. O. Key, Jr., called attention to a type of election “in which the decisive results of the voting reveal a sharp alteration of the pre-existing cleavage within the electorate.”<sup>5</sup> These “critical elections” or realignments have been the subject of a voluminous literature.<sup>6</sup> James L. Sundquist in *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States*,<sup>7</sup> my favorite treatment of the topic, observed that realigning eras contain at their core a shift in underlying partisan attachments among a large segment of the voters. In these eras, many people either switch their party allegiance or are mobilized out of their indifference to participate in the electoral process.

Why do these changes occur? Sundquist provides a compelling answer. At the beginning of any realignment period, one finds a party system in which the two parties are divided along a set of issues and philosophy rooted in past battles. Then, there arises a new issue or a cluster of issues that is different from the old issues that divided the parties. In Sundquist's phrase, the new issue or cluster “cuts across” the existing line of cleavage. For example, the cleavage that divided the Whig party and the Democratic party in the 1830s and 1840s had little to do with slavery. Determined abolitionists forced this “crosscutting” issue to the center of national debate by the 1850s, dividing the parties in new ways and precipitating the first major

national realignment. In fact, the strain was so great on the Whig party that it disappeared and was replaced by the Republican party.

In examining U.S. political history since the formation of mass political parties in the late 1820s, Sundquist identifies three major realignments. The first, the Civil War-era realignment just mentioned above, actually occurred in the mid-1850s in the years leading up to the start of the bloody sectional conflict in 1861. The war itself embedded the new partisan attachments deep in the fabric of the nation's politics for several generations and launched the American South on its separate political path. In the North the Grand Old Party, the victorious party of national unity, became the dominant political institution, although the northern Democratic party survived being on the "wrong side" of the Civil War, as James McGregor Burns put it,<sup>8</sup> to remain remarkably competitive in the 1870s and 1880s.

Then came a major realignment during the Populist era of the 1890s, culminating in the critical 1896 election when the Democrats and Populists under William Jennings Bryan failed to make common cause with their natural allies—laborers in the cities of the East—and were decisively beaten.<sup>9</sup> Under the leadership of Ohio's William McKinley and Marcus Hanna, the GOP "emerge[d] as a grand new party combining its old business, farm, veterans, and black support with widening labor backing; it was emerging also as a powerful governing instrument in Washington and in many of the state capitals."<sup>10</sup> In all of these Nineteenth Century changes, Ohio was in the thick of the action as Prof. George W. Knepper relates in the first chapter of *Ohio Politics* and in his fine history of the state, *Ohio and Its People*.<sup>11</sup>

By the turn of the century, the South's separate political path was well established. The party of Lincoln, Emancipation, and Reconstruction failed to take root in the South outside of the mountain regions in the decades immediately after the Civil War. By 1900, an all-white

Democratic party in the South had constructed a one-party system in the eleven states of the former Confederacy with the overriding purpose of maintaining white supremacy. As long as whites remained united in the all-white Democratic party, the argument went, blacks could be isolated and prevented from exercising the balance of power and possibly bargaining with two competing white political parties for an end to their second-class status. For the first six decades of the Twentieth Century, this odd political arrangement meant that the South would remain a region politically apart from the national mainstream.

Figures 2 and 3 illustrate both the South's separate political path as well as the great post-Civil War national realignments. Let's ignore for the moment the striking contrast between the South and the North for most of the period covered by the two figures and concentrate on the northern patterns, which highlight key national developments that had a major effect on Ohio.

First, the northern figure captures the critical nature of the 1896 election, showing, among other things, the noticeable drop in Democratic strength during the first decades of the new century. Because my illustrations are only for the Democratic side, this golden Republican era from 1896 through 1932 is depicted in reverse, that is, by showing the minority status of the Democrats in the North.<sup>12</sup>

The era of national Republican dominance culminated in the 1920s with the three consecutive victories of the GOP's standard-bearers in the decade's presidential elections: Warren G. Harding in 1920, Calvin Coolidge in 1924, and Herbert Hoover in 1928. At the start of the economic boom of the 1920s, President Harding, of Marion, Ohio, summed up the GOP's confidence: "This is essentially a business country. We hear a vast deal about 'big business,' but the big business of America is nothing but the aggregate of the small businesses. That is why we need business sense in charge of American administration, and why the majority of America has

for more than a half a century been a Republican majority."<sup>13</sup> With the onset of the Great Depression following the October 1929 stock market crash, the faith of the country in businessmen and Republicans was to undergo a dramatic reassessment. And, in the process, the country in the decade of the 1930s would undergo its third major realignment, the New Deal realignment, which would profoundly alter the American political landscape—and Ohio's as well.

As the nation sank into the worst economic depression in memory, Gov. Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York was swept into the presidency in the 1932 election because he was not Herbert Hoover. Or, as Sundquist simply put it: "When unemployment stands at 24 percent, as it did in 1932, an incumbent president is not reelected."<sup>14</sup> In the campaign, FDR avoided spelling out a specific program, but, he did indicate in his famous "Forgotten Man" speech that his approach would differ from the Republicans: "These unhappy times call for . . . plans that . . . build from the bottom up and not from the top down, that put their faith once more in the forgotten man at the bottom of the economic pyramid."<sup>15</sup>

In office, Roosevelt initiated an unprecedented series of activist governmental initiatives that attempted to bolster the economy and to channel billions of dollars of aid—primarily work relief—to the millions of people in need. Further, in 1935, landmark structural changes were enacted into law, such as the National Labor Relations Act, which propelled the growth of vast industrial unions within a few years, and the Social Security Act. Of the latter, FDR said upon signing the measure that it was a long-overdue partial response to "startling industrial changes" and "gives at least some protection to thirty million of our citizens who will reap direct benefits through unemployment compensation, through old-age pensions and through increased services for the protection of children and the prevention of ill health."<sup>16</sup>

The scope of the federal government's activities—the regulation of banking, financial markets, and utility companies, the promotion of public power, aid to agriculture, rural electrification, to give a partial listing—was unprecedented, as the leaders of the Republican party pointed out at every turn. Sundquist captured the flavor of the opposition by quoting former President Hoover's increasingly harsh denunciations of the New Deal: " 'a muddle of uncoordinated reckless adventures in government,' 'the color of despotism . . . the color of Fascism . . . the color of Socialism,' 'flagrant flouting of the Constitution,' . . . 'the philosophy of collectivism and . . . greed for power,' . . . 'the gospel of class hatred preached from the White House.' "<sup>17</sup> And Roosevelt responded in kind, asserting, for example, at a thunderous Madison Square Garden rally on the eve of his smashing 1936 re-election victory: “ Never before in all our history have [the forces of organized money] been so united against one candidate as they stand today. They are unanimous in their hate for me—and I welcome their hatred. I should like to have it said of my first Administration . . . that in it the forces of selfishness and of lust for power met their match. I should like to have it said . . . of my second Administration that in it these forces met their master.”<sup>18</sup>

The tumultuous events of the New Deal era precipitated a realignment of American politics as powerful as the Civil War-era realignment. Roosevelt's leadership during the Depression crisis gave the party system a pronounced class division it did not have before the 1930s. The Democratic party under FDR came to be viewed as the champion of the working class. In 1940, one of the first of the early national public opinion polls captured the change. When asked which party they would like to see win the 1940 presidential election, 69 percent of lower-income respondents picked the Democrats while 64 percent of those in the upper-income category chose the Republicans.<sup>19</sup> The new cleavage in the party system manifested in the New

Deal realignment revolved around the proper role of the federal government in the economic and social life of the country. The issues were clearly drawn. The Republicans held to the traditional view of a limited role for the federal government in the nation's economic and social life and favored reliance on the forces of an unfettered market to provide prosperity. Roosevelt led the Democrats to the embrace of an activist federal government aimed at helping "those who have less."<sup>20</sup>

Although FDR put the Democrats on the road to national majority status, the new path set in motion by the Depression and the New Deal was not a straight uphill one. Continuing to ignore the South for the moment, Figure 2 shows Democratic party strength in the North rising with Roosevelt's big victory in 1932 but dropping back or stabilizing even while the President is increasing his vote in 1936. The figure demonstrates that Democratic strength in the northern states does not take a sustained upward swing until after World War II. Although the figure masks considerable state-by-state variation, it does accurately portray this fascinating second-stage of the New Deal realignment that played out in the party system in the North well into the 1950s and early 1960s (and even beyond, as I suggest below concerning Ohio).

Sundquist, who brilliantly and originally analyzed the phenomenon, labeled it "aftershocks of the New Deal earthquake--in the North."<sup>21</sup> Those who were first attracted to Roosevelt in the early years of the Depression also supported his party at the state and local level at far higher levels than the previously hopeless northern Democratic minority had any reason to expect. As FDR's popularity increased and as the realignment continued through the President's 1936 landslide re-election, voters realized that the New Deal Democrats in Washington bore little resemblance to the Democratic parties in their states and localities, which were still anchored in the pre-1932 mold.<sup>22</sup>

There arose after World War II a new generation of Democratic politicians committed to the Roosevelt revolution and determined to build activist state parties along the lines blazed by the New Deal. They were politicians like Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, Adlai Stevenson and Paul Douglas of Illinois, William Proxmire of Wisconsin, George McGovern of South Dakota, Edmund Muskie of Maine, Frank Church of Idaho, Alan Cranston of California. Sundquist calls them "programmatic liberals" and demonstrates how they were at the forefront of transforming politics in the North, where Republicans once held safe majorities. To follow the New Deal transformation thoroughly—which is far beyond the scope of this paper— would require delving into the political histories of all the northern states and attempting to untangle various state party strength figures similar to Ohio's. Overall, the programmatic liberals replaced the Democratic party's old image, and these new northern leaders gave the party new life and electoral victories, and, in the process, brought politics in the northern states into general conformity with the national cleavages begun by FDR's New Deal at the presidential level.<sup>23</sup> The Ohio variation on this northern theme, depicted in Figure 1, is a vital point that I address below.

The New Deal realignment took a different course in the solidly Democratic South. Roosevelt remained popular in Dixie throughout his tenure, but, as Figure 3 shows, the partisan realignment he brought to the rest of the country did not disturb Dixie's one-party system, which was rooted in the older, overriding desire of southern whites to preserve white supremacy. Within the southern one-party system, pro-New Deal and anti-New Deal factions emerged, but both sides were firmly wedded to the Democratic party and what it stood for in racial terms. But the New Deal did set in motion outside of the South an important development that would lead to the national Democratic party's civil rights crisis after World War II.

At the turn of the century, ninety percent of the nation's blacks lived in the South. An exodus of southern blacks to the cities of the North occurred in the first half of the Twentieth Century, resulting in 50 percent of the nation's African Americans living in the North by mid-century. And during the Depression, these working-class blacks of the North abandoned their loyalty to the party of Lincoln for Franklin Roosevelt and the Democratic party,<sup>24</sup> a change reflected symbolically in the seating at the 1936 Democratic National Convention of the first black delegates in the party's long history. Thus, at this juncture, the Democratic party became both the home of blacks in the North and the party of white supremacy in the South, a remarkable, ironic state of affairs that would not last very long!

Although FDR managed through the end of his life to keep his distance from the impending crisis in the Democratic party over racial segregation in the South, his successor, Harry S. Truman, did not. In early 1947 President Truman established a civil rights commission to examine the plight of America's blacks. When the commission in October 1947 issued its "sweeping denunciation of all governmental and some private sanctions of race discrimination or segregation," Truman called the report, entitled *To Secure These Rights*, "an American charter of human freedom" and implemented many of its suggestions within his power, such as integrating the military. The next year the 1948 Democratic National Convention adopted a strong civil rights platform amid stirring oratory from northern liberals. For example, during the floor debate at the convention, Hubert Humphrey told the delegates: "[It is time] for the Democratic Party to get out of the shadow of states' rights and to walk forthrightly into the bright sunshine of human rights." The southern reaction to these developments was swift and bitter. "There are not enough laws on the books of the nation, nor can there be enough laws, to break down segregation

in the South," declared Gov. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, who was nominated for president in 1948 by the hastily formed States' Rights party, nicknamed the Dixiecrats.<sup>25</sup>

In the 1950s, the U.S. Supreme Court moved the process forward by outlawing school segregation in the historic *Brown* decision, and by the end of the decade a potent civil rights movement had emerged to press for national action. Then, in the mid-1960s the southern one-party monolith crumbled as national Democratic party leaders, over the loud protests of southern Democratic leaders, carried out a Second Reconstruction, a series of eventful departures epitomized in the era's twin legislative capstones, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Despite a cautious beginning, President John F. Kennedy employed the power of the federal government to enforce court-ordered integration and to protect civil rights workers in the South. Then in 1963, he introduced his sweeping civil rights bill that would, among other things, outlaw racial discrimination in public accommodations and employment. After Kennedy's assassination, President Lyndon B. Johnson grabbed the mantle of civil rights and skillfully guided the landmark civil rights legislation to passage in 1964 over a last-ditch southern filibuster in the Senate. These momentous developments shattered the rationale for the one-party Democratic South and led to the birth of the two-party South.

Figure 3 depicts the dramatic subsequent demise of the Democratic South over the last four decades. The complex nature of Dixie's new politics after the mid-1960s is a topic beyond the scope of this paper.<sup>26</sup> However, a comparison of the last decade and a half in both the southern and northern figures demonstrates one impressive result of the upheaval in Dixie: the arrival during the 1990s of a nationally competitive party system for the first time since the 1850s, a development that would have been impossible without the breakup of the one-party South. Thus, by the middle 1990s the South and the rest of the nation had converged into a

nationwide system of two-party competition, one that exhibited notable overall balance between the Democratic and Republican parties as the Twenty-First Century dawned.<sup>27</sup>

While the South was undergoing rapid change, the national party system did not stand still, however. In fact, a series of "crosscutting" issues—to continue to employ Sundquist's useful framework—disrupted the New Deal party system, starting in the tumultuous decade of the 1960s. These disruptions were driven by bitter racial conflicts in the big cities of the North, violent protests over U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war, and a series of emotional social and cultural issues involving crime in the streets and the accompanying calls for law and order, disputes over abortion, women's rights, gun control, prayer in public schools, the rights of homosexuals, among others. This new cluster of issues cut across the existing New Deal line of partisan cleavage in the North and weakened the Democratic party there by driving away a sizable number of the party's core supporters in the white working class and lower-middle class,<sup>28</sup> contributing mightily to the Republican party's victory in five out of the six presidential elections from Richard Nixon's first election in the chaotic political year of 1968 to George H. W. Bush's election in 1988.

In my view, these disruptions—which temporarily eased somewhat in the mid-1970s as a result of Watergate and the election of Georgia's Jimmy Carter, the lone successful Democrat during the era—constituted a realignment that I call "the Twenty-Five Years' Realignment."<sup>29</sup> The period starts in 1964/1965 as the civil rights movement shifted attention to the North and as the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war escalated. It ends in 1988/1989 with the 1988 presidential election—a "bloody shirt" campaign<sup>30</sup> capping off the era—and with the start in the following year of a sequence of events that would lead to the end of Cold War and the Soviet empire.

In the 1988 election Gov. Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts, the Democratic national standard-bearer, suffered in graphic fashion from the various accumulated Democratic party stigmas that made the Twenty-Five Years' Realignment a successful national partisan reshuffling favorable to the GOP. For example, as a result of the intra-party battles over Vietnam, the Democratic party, a party with impeccable Cold War credentials from Presidents Truman to Kennedy, became stigmatized to its electoral detriment as less steadfast in the worldwide struggle with the Soviet Union and its allies and too willing to cut the defense budget. Likewise, the "Social Issue," as the domestic disruptions associated with "racial strife, Vietnam, and crime and lawlessness" came to be labeled,<sup>31</sup> diminished the Democrats' electoral base. In an insightful and influential book on these disruptions, Thomas Byrne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall explained the situation this way:

As the civil rights movement became national, as it became clearly associated with the Democratic party, and as it began to impinge on local neighborhoods and schools, it served to crack the Democratic loyalties of key white voters. Crucial numbers of voters—in the white, urban and suburban neighborhoods of the North, and across the South—were, in addition, deeply angered and distressed by aspects of the expanding rights revolution. It has been among the white working and lower-middle classes that many of the social changes stemming from the introduction of new rights—civil rights for minorities, reproductive and workplace rights for women, constitutional protections for the criminally accused, immigration opportunities for those from developing countries, free-speech rights to pornographers, and the surfacing of highly visible homosexual communities—have been most deeply resisted.<sup>32</sup> Resentment of the civil

rights movement among key white voters was reinforced and enlarged by cultural and economic conflicts resulting from the rights revolution.<sup>33</sup>

The Bush campaign strategists in 1988 fully understood how the national Democrats had been put on the defensive during this period, and they crafted a skillful "bloody shirt" campaign designed to capitalize on the disruptive, crosscutting issues of the Twenty-Five Years' Realignment. These involved television ads that criticized Governor Dukakis over "a Massachusetts prison furlough program in which a convicted murderer named Willie Horton, released for a weekend during Dukakis' tenure, fled and later committed rape"<sup>34</sup>; attacked him for opposing the death penalty; and criticized him for vetoing a Massachusetts bill requiring the firing of school teachers who refused to lead students in the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag, legislation the liberal governor objected to as unconstitutional under U.S. Supreme Court precedents. Also, Dukakis, who lacked experience in national security matters, was hammered in ads as a representative of a Democratic party all too eager to slash the defense budget. Two chroniclers of the election wrote that the negative TV ad campaign left viewers with "the inference that the Democratic nominee was not only unpatriotic and soft on crime but also soft or weak on national defense."<sup>35</sup>

The point of lingering on the 1988 campaign is not to pass judgment on the Bush tactics but to demonstrate how a Republican presidential candidate benefited from tying his Democratic opponent to the issue positions that over a twenty-five-year period disrupted and weakened the national majority party's electoral base. With the end of the Cold War and the decline in significance of national security issues, a part of the Democratic stigma faded. And in 1992, a "New Democrat," Bill Clinton, moved his national party away from an array of "liberal" domestic positions that were viewed as electoral losers. Clinton, the savvy, nationally oriented,

veteran Democratic governor of Arkansas, thoroughly comprehended his party's presidential weakness. At a May 1991 gathering in Cleveland of the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), a group of centrist Democrats, he declared: "Too many of the people who used to vote for us, the very burdened middle class we're talking about, have not trusted us in national elections to defend our national interests abroad, to put their values in our social policy at home or to take their tax money and spend it with discipline. We've got to turn these perceptions around, or we can't continue as a national party." In the words of a *New York Times* reporter, Clinton, who was the DLC's chairman that year, "argued eloquently throughout the session for a 'new choice' that does not abandon the party's traditional commitment to the poor, particularly poor children, but that is able to sell itself as the advocate of the middle class as well, and thus return to power."<sup>36</sup>

After securing the 1992 Democratic presidential nomination and picking a fellow southerner and DLC member, Sen. Al Gore, Jr., of Tennessee, as his vice presidential running mate, Clinton stuck to his "new Democrat" theme in a brilliant national campaign. One of the Democratic ticket's first television commercials described the two southerners as follows: "They are a new generation of Democrats, Bill Clinton and Al Gore. And they don't think the way the old Democratic Party did. They've called for an end to welfare as we know it, so welfare can be a second chance, not a way of life. They've sent a strong signal to criminals by supporting the death penalty. And they've rejected the old tax and spend politics." As the Edsalls wrote: "In effect, Clinton and Gore contrasted themselves to just the Democratic images that had been at the center of the [winning] campaigns of Richard Nixon in 1968 and 1972, Ronald Reagan in 1980 and 1984, and George Bush in 1988."<sup>37</sup>

In a sense, Clinton conceded the reality of the Twenty-Five Years' Realignment by conducting himself in his two successful presidential campaigns and in most of his presidency, especially after the Republicans captured both houses of Congress in the party's triumphant 1994 midterm sweep, as a "me too" Democrat. In his performance, Clinton was acting much like Thomas Dewey and the other "me too" Republicans did when they made peace with the New Deal in the 1940s and 1950s and adopted many of its tenets while pledging to administer the new social programs more efficiently.<sup>38</sup>

Before taking up the three presidential elections of the Twenty-First Century, let's examine how the Ohio electoral patterns relate to the broader electoral changes just described.

From the Populist-era realignment of the 1890s through the 1920s, the patterns in Ohio shown in Figure 1 roughly follow those in the North as a whole as depicted in Figure 2 except that the Ohio Democratic party was not as weak as the regional norm. This relative Ohio Democratic strength in a strong Republican era in the North resulted partly from the influence of several notable Ohio Democratic leaders during the Progressive era, including Governors Judson Harmon and James M. Cox and Mayors Tom L. Johnson and Newton D. Baker of Cleveland.<sup>39</sup>

As shown in Figure 1, the Ohio Democratic party received a big boost from Franklin Roosevelt's national success in the 1930s. However, Ohio did not experience the strong second-stage "aftershocks" of the New Deal realignment in the typical northern pattern that is depicted in Figure 2. Essential for the triumph of the second-stage throughout the North was the rise of a vigorous "programmatic liberal" leadership, as sketched above. Key Democratic leaders in Ohio did not fit this mold. Consider, for example, Martin L. Davey, a Portage county Democrat, who won the governorship in 1934 and was re-elected in 1936 when FDR carried Ohio with 58.0 percent of the vote, the largest Democratic presidential margin until Lyndon Johnson's 62.9

percent in 1964. As Professor Knepper observed, “Davey appeared unimpressed by the New Deal’s popularity and kept up a running feud with federal authorities over what he felt was their interference in state affairs and their wasteful mismanagement of federal programs.”<sup>40</sup>

Commenting later on how several Democratic governors were “as tight-fisted as any Republican,” Knepper wrote: “Indeed, during the crisis of the Great Depression, Governor Davey was one of the nation’s chief defenders of states’ rights against the intrusions of the federal government, a stance which seemed more likely to be taken by a southern governor than by the executive of a would-be progressive northern industrial state.”<sup>41</sup>

Further, the dominant Ohio Democratic leader of the post-World War II era was another conservative Democrat, Frank Lausche, a Clevelander with an appealing personality and excellent campaign skills to go along with his maverick, anti-union positions. Lausche served ten years as governor and twelve years as a U.S. senator between 1945 and 1969. (See Brian Usher’s Chapter 3 in *Ohio Politics* for more details on Lausche.)

The 1958 Ohio Republican debacle over an ill-fated, GOP-sponsored right-to-work amendment, as related by Mike Curtin in Chapter 4 of *Ohio Politics*, contributed to the gubernatorial victory that year of Michael DiSalle, the Democratic mayor of Toledo, with 56.9 percent of the vote. Although “not a classic liberal,” in Knepper’s phrase, “[DiSalle] had progressive ideas for improving state services, especially in education and in state custodial institutions” and succeeded in securing increased state spending in these areas over stiff Republican opposition in the legislature, which grew stronger in the last two years of his single term.<sup>42</sup> In the 1962 election, Republican James A. Rhodes labeled DiSalle “Tax-Hike Mike” and ousted him with 58.9 percent of the vote to the Democratic incumbent’s 41.1 percent, in the first of four gubernatorial victories by Rhodes over the next two decades.

It was not until 1970 that a classic Democratic “programmatic liberal” captured the Ohio governorship when John J. Gilligan of Cincinnati won the office with 54.2 percent of vote; in 1970 Governor Rhodes was constitutionally ineligible to run for a third consecutive term. In fact, two years earlier with the strong support of organized labor, Gilligan had handily defeated Senator Lausche’s bid for re-nomination in a bitter 1968 Democratic primary. Gilligan lost the 1968 general election for the Senate seat, partly because resentful conservative Lausche supporters voted for the Republican nominee, William B. Saxbe. (Incidentally, Gilligan’s daughter, Kathleen Sebelius, is the current two-term Democratic governor of Kansas, making them the only father-daughter gubernatorial pair in American history up to now.)

In office, Governor Gilligan successfully pushed through Ohio’s first graduated income tax as well as increases in budget expenditures for a host of state services. As Hugh C. McDiarmid concluded in Chapter 6 of *Ohio Politics*, “[Gilligan’s] efforts produced substantial reforms in education, welfare, mental health, the environment, consumer protection, and governmental ethics” and “marked the first successfully progressive administration” since Governor Cox’s 1913-14 term during the Progressive era. In a stunning upset in 1974, a strong Democratic year in Ohio and the nation, former Governor Rhodes narrowly defeated Gilligan’s re-election bid.<sup>43</sup>

Eight years later, again when Rhodes was barred from seeking re-election, another liberal Democrat, Richard F. Celeste of Cleveland, won the governorship and served two controversial terms in which he increased state spending and promoted a liberal agenda. For an assessment of Governor Celeste’s eight years in office, see Tim Miller’s Chapter 8 in *Ohio Politics*. Also, in the 1970s Ohio elected two Democratic U.S. senator, John H. Glenn, a former astronaut and a moderate, in 1974, and Howard Metzenbaum, a former businessman and a fiery liberal, in 1976.

These Democratic successes, spanning the 1970s and 1980s, represented a delayed penetration of the New Deal realignment in Ohio, a process slowed by the dominance of several conservative Democratic politicians, especially Lausche, and the paucity of prominent Democratic “programmatically liberal” leaders in the immediate post-World War II decades. Figure 1 documents the arrival of this delayed Democratic strength, which occurred in an era when Democratic presidential candidates were faring poorly in Ohio and elsewhere as the Twenty-Five Years’ Realignment took hold in the nation. Compare the high Democratic party strength percentages for the 1970s and much of the 1980s in Figure 1 (the solid line) with the generally weak performance of the party’s presidential nominees in Ohio during the same period (the dotted line).

Then came the plunge for Ohio Democrats, or, to look at it from the perspective of Ohio Republicans, then came the GOP’s amazing surge to dominance in the Buckeye State from 1990 to 2004. From a high point of 57.5 percent in 1986, the David index of Democratic party strength in Ohio dropped to 50.4 percent in 1990 and 44.6 percent in 1992, bottomed out at 34.5 percent<sup>44</sup> in the nationwide Republican sweep of 1994, and remained between the mid-40s to around 40 percent through 2004, when the figure reached 45.2 percent. The average David index score for Ohio Democrats from 1990 to 2004 was 42.4 percent.

Chapters 9, 10, and 11 of *Ohio Politics* on the eras of George Voinovich, the Cleveland Republican who won the governorship for the first time in 1990, and Bob Taft, the Cincinnati Republican, who won the first of his two terms in 1998, present the details of the recent era of Republican domination as does Lee Leonard’s overview Chapter 2. The nature of the GOP’s “big tent” party is on display throughout those pages, especially the tensions between the socially and culturally conservative Republicans and those Republicans who place more emphasis on the

party's older tradition of economic conservatism. The issue positions of the new group of Republicans flow directly from the forces that fueled the Twenty-Five Years' Realignment nationwide and are new to the party system. As described above, a national, pro-Republican realignment centered on social and cultural issues occurred between 1964/65 and 1988/89 and swept over the older economic/role-of-government New Deal divisions then dominant in the party system. In Ohio these newer pro-Republican forces entered the political system at a time when the "aftershocks" of the older pro-Democratic realignment were just finally playing out here.

In a sense, the result was not unlike what happened in the American South, although the circumstances of the existing party structures were quite different. In Dixie the remnants of the old one-party Democratic system yielded only slowly in fits-and-starts during the 1970s and 1980s to the nascent Republican party; see Figure 3. In Ohio the Democratic party received a boost in the 1970s and 1980s as the "aftershocks" of the New Deal realignment played out after a delay of several decades. In both cases, the newer social/cultural forces were present but did not push the GOP forward in a meaningful way until the 1990s. In Ohio and the South, powerful new "aftershocks" have been felt since the early 1990s, but this time they were "aftershocks" of the Twenty-Five Years' Realignment.

Perhaps it was no accident that 1994 marked not only the year the GOP captured the U.S. House for the first time in forty years, but also the year the GOP captured the Ohio House of Representatives as well. The Republican party maintained control of the Ohio House and added control of all of the state constitutional offices and all but one seat on the Ohio Supreme Court to go along with its previous control of the Ohio Senate. That's the way things stood prior to the 2006 elections.

By the time the new century arrived, the Twenty-Five Years' Realignment coupled with the dramatic transformation of the American South had given the nation a remarkably balanced party system overall. This point was driven home in the voting for president in November 2000, an election so close that 36 days of post-election legal wrangling over the razor-thin margin in Florida were needed to name the national Republican nominee, Gov. George W. Bush of Texas, the winner. The partisan balance in Congress was also close, but the GOP maintained its majorities in both houses.

The 2000 presidential vote in Ohio was closer than both sides had anticipated. Bush won the state's 21 electoral votes with 50.0 percent to Vice President Al Gore's 46.4 percent. Apparently discouraged by the polls in Ohio, Gore ceased running television commercials in the state in early October to focus his resources on several other important large states, although he retained his get-out-the-vote field organization here, a factor that contributed to the relatively close result, much closer than the polls indicated a month earlier.

Even before the 2004 presidential election season started in earnest, speculation had begun that Ohio might be a critical, if not pivotal, state in the election, perhaps the next Florida. As a result Ohio received an unprecedented amount of attention from both parties and from the news media. For one thing, the state's past presidential election patterns were pored over. These revealed that Ohio had voted for the winner in 23 of the 25 presidential elections of the Twentieth Century, a bellwether record matched only by Missouri. Only in 1944, when Ohioan John W. Bricker was the Republican vice-presidential nominee, and in 1960, when Richard Nixon carried the state, did Ohio voters break with the national choice. Also, much was made of the fact that no Republican had ever been elected president without winning Ohio, a point I mentioned at the beginning of this paper.

The early speculation that Ohio in 2004 would be “the Heart of It All,” to quote a recent state slogan, proved correct. The closely balanced electoral-vote division on Election Night, November 2, 2004, revealed that the Ohio outcome would determine the winner. In the end, President Bush carried the state with 50.8 percent of the vote to 48.3 percent for Senator John F. Kerry of Massachusetts, the Democratic standard-bearer, who conceded the election the next day when he realized that the Ohio result could not be challenged successfully. Of the 5.6 million votes cast in the state, Bush’s victory margin was 118,775 votes, close enough to bring forth more than a few explanations of the outcome. Incidentally, spurred by extraordinary voter registration and get-out-the-vote efforts by both parties and their allies, 933,633 more Ohioans voted in 2004 than did in 2000, an astounding 19.6 percent expansion of the electorate.<sup>45</sup>

A good way to get a handle on Ohio’s voting patterns in 2004 and earlier is to examine county-level trends in the state over the last five presidential elections, which are shown in the map in Figure 4.<sup>46</sup> The well-known areas of strongest Democratic and Republican strength in the state catch your eye immediately.

The Democratic strongholds stretch through the northern tier of the state from Toledo (Lucas county) in the northwest through the populous northeastern counties around Cleveland (Lorain and Cuyahoga) and Akron (Summit) over to Ashtabula on the Pennsylvania state line and down through Warren (Trumbull) to Youngstown (Mahoning) and Steubenville (Jefferson) and two Ohio River counties south of Jefferson county (Belmont and the sparsely populated county of Monroe). [Incidentally, Cuyahoga is the state’s largest county in population with 1,393,978 people in the 2000 U.S. census.] These counties are a key part of the state’s manufacturing base that has been hit hard in recent years. Unions retain strength here, and the

cities, especially Cleveland, have a socially liberal orientation. Athens county, where Ohio University is located, completes the top Democratic list.

These eleven counties voted Democratic in all of the last five presidential elections and are the bedrock of the Democratic party in Ohio. For example, all of them were in the top quartile of Ohio counties supporting Lee Fisher, the losing Democratic candidate for governor in 1998. Although they are only 12.5 percent of Ohio's 88 counties, these eleven counties had a population in the 2000 U.S. census of a little less than 3.5 million of Ohio's 11.3 million population, or 30.7 percent.

Among the other eight counties that have voted more Democratic than Republican in the last five elections are Montgomery (Dayton), the state's fourth largest county with a population of 559,062, and Franklin (Columbus), the state's second most populous county with 1,068,978 people. By the way, the growth of Democratic strength in Franklin county in recent elections is an important new development in Ohio politics. The other six counties are Stark (city of Canton), Clark (city of Springfield), Erie (city of Sandusky), Portage county, where Kent State University is located, Columbiana county directly south of Youngstown, and the sparsely populated Harrison county near the Ohio River. *[Incidentally, of these eight, Montgomery and Portage counties had four Democratic wins to one Republican victory; the other six had three Democratic wins to two for the GOP. See Figure 4.]* These counties have 2.5 million residents and bring the population of the 19 Democratic-leaning counties to a little under 6 million people, or 52.8 percent of the state's population.

Of the remaining 69 counties, 48 of them—or 54.5 percent of the state's counties—voted for the Republican presidential candidate in all of the last five presidential elections. This Republican strength is anchored in Southwest Ohio, including Hamilton county (Cincinnati), the

state's third largest county with 845,303 people, and the three counties next to it—Butler, Warren, and Clermont. Together these four counties have 1.5 million people and make an important contribution to GOP strength in the state.

As Figure 4 indicates, the other 44 strongest Republican counties stretch throughout western and central Ohio and cover a vast area of the state, including many of Ohio's heavily agricultural counties. They are a diverse group, but are predominantly rural, small-town counties with a mixture of suburban and exurban counties. Another eight counties, including prosperous Lake county north of Cleveland, voted Republican four out of five times.

The remaining thirteen counties voted Republican in three out of the last five presidential elections. The bulk of these counties are centered in economically depressed Southeast Ohio, a part of Appalachia that is known as a swing region in Ohio elections.<sup>47</sup> In an October 5, 2004, forum at Case Western Reserve University, two prominent Ohio party leaders, one a Democrat and one a Republican, pointed to this region as the key to the 2004 election. James Ruvolo, who was chairman of the Ohio Democratic party for eight and a half years in the 1980s and served as state chairman of the 2004 Kerry campaign in Ohio, said: "If Southeast Ohio votes their pocketbooks, then we win. That's what happened in 1992 and 1996. If Southeast Ohio votes cultural issues, then Republicans win. We are working very hard in Southeast Ohio to talk about the issues that matter in terms of the economy—to talk about what they are talking about at their dinner table. We think we are being very successful." For his part, Robert T. Bennett, the veteran chairman of the Ohio Republican party since 1988, noted: "Southeast Ohio is Appalachia. Accurately depicted [by Jim Ruvolo, who spoke first at the forum], it is the swing area of the state. I think the message this year has been very good, particularly on some of the social issues that my counterpart referenced."<sup>48</sup>

Also at the forum Bennett was asked about the possible impact on the presidential election of Issue One, a constitutional amendment to bar gay marriage and civil unions in the state. He responded candidly: “Issue One is designed to bring out the conservative religious right—make sure they get to the polls—particularly the concentration in the area that Jim was talking about, Southeast Ohio, and Southwest Ohio, where it’s a big issue.”<sup>49</sup>

When the votes were counted, Bennett’s hopes were fulfilled when the Southeast swing counties went handily for President Bush and gave overwhelming support to Issue One in process. For example, Gallia and Meigs counties gave Bush 61.3 percent and 58.2 percent, respectively, to Kerry’s 38.3 percent and 41.2 percent. Clinton carried Meigs in 1992 and 1996 and Gallia in 1996, although he lost the latter by a relatively narrow 3 percentage points in 1992. By contrast, Issue One, which was adopted statewide with 61.7 percent, rang up huge margins in Gallia and Meigs—79.8 percent and 75.1 percent. In the metropolitan counties of Cuyahoga and Franklin, Issue One passed only narrowly with 53.3 percent and 52.0 percent, respectively.

A *New York Times* reporter asked Chairman Bennett about the impact of the anti-gay marriage amendment the day after the election. “I’d be naïve if I didn’t say it helped. And it helped most in what we refer to as the Bible Belt area of southeastern and southwestern Ohio, where we had the largest percentage increase in support for the president.”<sup>50</sup> Then U.S. Representative Ted Strickland, a Democrat whose 6<sup>th</sup> District included a good portion of Southeast Ohio, assessed the election this way in comments quoted in the *Plain Dealer*: “I think he [Kerry] lost because there was a perception in significant areas of small-town and rural Ohio that somehow Kerry did not hold views and values that were consistent with their own.” Strickland also said, in the words of the *Plain Dealer* reporters, that “he doesn’t attribute Kerry’s loss to lack of effort, a flawed message or a defective ground game.” “Everything that could

have been done was done and that's one of the discouraging things about the outcome," added Strickland, who would be elected governor of Ohio two years later.<sup>51</sup>

The 2004 importance of cultural issues—the stuff of the Twenty-Five Years' Realignment—was not the whole story of the presidential election in Ohio. Exit polls add another dimension to our understanding of Ohio electoral politics. Tables 1 to 6 present the responses of 2,020 Ohioans as they left the polls on November 2, 2004, as well as those of a national exit poll sample of 13,660 Americans.<sup>52</sup> The tables reveal voter attitudes on a host of issues in addition to offering basic demographic information about the respondents. When all of this information is cross-tabulated with how the respondents said they voted, the results demonstrate that many factors contributed to the explanation of why Ohioans voted as they did in the 2004 presidential election. In the process, a fuller, more complex portrait of the Ohio electorate emerges.

To begin, Table 1 presents the Bush/Kerry choice by income category, showing that the old New Deal economic-class cleavages are still present in the state and nation.<sup>53</sup> Lower income voters are much more likely to vote for the Democratic nominee; upper income voters tend to side with the Republican incumbent.

Table 2 reveals that the self-identification of voters with the two major political parties strongly influences their vote: 94 percent of Republican identifiers backed Bush and 90 percent of Democrats voted for Kerry. Interestingly, Republican partisans in Ohio were slightly more faithful to their national candidate than were Ohio Democrats. The gap is even wider in the national figures. Independents in Ohio favored Kerry; in the national exit poll, they are split. Table 2 also indicates that more Ohioans in November 2004 identified with the Republican party (40 percent) than with the Democratic party (35 percent). Self-identified independents were 25

percent of the sample. Nationally, the two parties were even at 37 percent each with independents at 26 percent. Party identification figures must be viewed over many years, not just at one point in time, in order to be confident of their significance.

Table 3 presents the 2004 presidential choice sorted by whether respondents describe their ideology as liberal, moderate, or conservative. Not surprisingly, the self-identified liberals voted overwhelmingly for Kerry (85 percent) and the self-identified conservatives did the same for the President (87 percent). Moderates, who made up 47 percent of the sample, went for Kerry by 59 percent to Bush's 41 percent. Note that many more people picked the conservative label over the liberal one, 34 percent to 19 percent, which is not a surprising result given the stigmas that came to be attached to the term "liberal" after the mid-1960s. These Ohio findings roughly mirror the national result.

Another way of sorting out the voters is through the answer to this personal economic question: "Compared to four years ago, is your family's financial situation 1) better today 2) worse today or 3) about the same?" Table 4 displays the results. Of the 29 percent of the Ohio sample who answered "better," 87 percent of them voted for the President. And, of the 32 percent who said "worse," 85 percent voted for Kerry. Thirty-seven percent of the Ohio sample answered "the same," and they opted for Bush over Kerry by 55 percent to 45 percent. The national figures differed slightly from the Ohio result.

The controversial nature of the Iraq war is reflected in Table 5. Ohioans who "strongly approve" of the war (30 percent of the sample) backed the President by 91 percent to 9 percent for Kerry. Ninety-six percent of those who "strongly disapprove" of the war (27 percent of the sample) favored Kerry and 3 percent Bush. The national sample was slightly less approving of

the war overall, but the split among Kerry and Bush voters on the issue was similar to what was found in Ohio.

In the most controversial question of the 2004 exit poll, voters were asked, “Which one issue [of a list of seven issues] mattered most in deciding how you voted for president?” The cross-tabulations in Table 6 are fascinating. Of those who chose terrorism (17 percent of the Ohio sample), 90 percent voted for Bush. Those picking Iraq (13 percent) voted by 72 percent for Kerry. Twenty-four percent of the Ohio sample chose “economy/jobs,” and those voters went for Kerry by 83 percent to Bush’s 17 percent. “Moral values” was picked as the issue that mattered most in deciding their vote by 23 percent of the sample of Ohioans, and Bush won their votes overwhelmingly, 85 percent to Kerry’s 14 percent. The ambiguous nature of the term “moral values” led to an acrimonious post-election debate over the significance of the relatively large percentage of voters who selected “moral values” as the one issue that mattered most to them among the seven choices. Bush loyalists argued that the result demonstrated the importance to their victory in 2004 of a variety of conservative cultural issues. Kerry supporters said the result was inconclusive because the term had not been defined in the question; they pointed out, for example, that opposition to the Iraq war could be seen as a “moral values” stance.

In my view, the Bush forces have the better argument because there is no denying that conservative cultural issues (and the term “moral values” in the current political context is almost a synonym for them) are an important component of the present party system as it was reshaped by the events of the Twenty-Five Years’ Realignment. Yet, prevalent in today’s partisan divisions, as revealed in Tables 1 to 6, are also elements that predate the latest realignment. These are the economic and role-of-government issues that entered the party system during the

New Deal realignment of the 1930s and then spread throughout the country and Ohio over several post-World War II “aftershocks” decades. They live on despite the reshuffling that occurred between 1964/1965 and 1988/1989, adding to the intricacy of the current party system.

One must now graft atop this complex partisan mix the effects of the epoch-shattering terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. In the minds of many Americans, President Bush received high marks for his response to the 9/11 tragedy. Further, the on-going war on terrorism has added a new element to the party system that has yet to be played out. The overwhelming public support President Bush received for carrying the fight to the al-Qaeda terrorists and their Taliban protectors in Afghanistan shortly after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon dissipated in the controversy over the 2003 Iraq war, which divided the country down the middle.

All these realities are reflected in the exit poll results just examined. They show that not only did the 2004 vote for president in Ohio and the nation contain aspects present in both major electoral realignments of the Twentieth Century, but that a new element flowing from the 9/11 attacks and the on-going war on terrorism has entered our politics as well in the early years of the Twenty-First Century. No doubt these considerations prompted Jim Ruvolo, the veteran Ohio Democratic party official, to offer the following explanation of the 2004 vote in Ohio: “My view is that in those counties [of Southeast Ohio] and overall, Bush won on the security issue. The Republicans were able to raise doubts about the ability of Kerry to keep the country safe. . . . [T]heir message came down to ‘better the devil you know’ as it relates to the security issue. We were never able to get enough conservative Democrats and moderate independents to vote on the economic issues.”<sup>54</sup>

Another way to gauge electoral change is to compare the county-by-county election results for the presidential nominees of the major parties over several elections in search of shifting patterns of support. This can be done efficiently using a reasonably simple statistical method, Pearson's product-moment correlation technique, which is a straightforward calculation that any non-statistician can appreciate after receiving a brief explanation.<sup>55</sup>

By comparing county vote percentages of two candidates of the same party over two elections, the correlation technique yields a coefficient that varies from +1.0 to -1.0 with a high positive number indicating a close relationship between the two candidates over the two elections. For example, if the county percentages of the 2000 Democratic nominee in Ohio's eighty-eight counties, Al Gore, and the county percentages of the Democratic nominee in 2004, John Kerry, were quite similar, then the coefficient would approach +1.0. This would indicate Gore and Kerry drew support in roughly the same proportions in all the counties throughout the state in these two elections. In fact, the Gore/Kerry county patterns were very similar, producing a coefficient of .97, close to a perfect correlation.

If the county percentages for these two Democratic nominees had been negatively related, that is, if in counties where one candidate was strong, the other was weak, and vice versa, then the coefficient would approach -1.0. If the county patterns of the two candidates were unrelated, that is, the patterns were random, the coefficient would be close to zero.

I have produced correlations for all of the Democratic presidential nominees from 1952 to 2004 in Ohio. They are presented in a matrix in Table 7. Any of these correlations can be pictured via a scattergram, as is the case in Figure 5 for the highly positive Gore/Kerry correlation. A diamond-shaped marker is placed on this scattergram at the point where a county's vote percentages for Gore and Kerry intersect. As the illustration demonstrates, where

Kerry was strong, Gore was strong, and, where Kerry was weak, Gore was weak. Thus, Figure 5 depicts a highly stable relationship between the county-by-county vote patterns of both national Democratic standard-bearers over the four-year period.

Further, this scattergram also offers a convenient ordering of Ohio's counties based on their recent presidential voting inclinations. By starting at the top right corner of the scattergram with Cuyahoga county (Cleveland) and going down the "best fit" line,<sup>56</sup> one traces in rough fashion the descending Democratic support pattern in the Buckeye State. By starting at the bottom left with Holmes and Putnam, the strongest Republican counties, and moving upward, one encounters the state's strongest Republican counties in descending order as well.

The correlation technique and accompanying scattergrams are especially valuable for isolating changing patterns of county-level support across time. The national electoral disruptions that I call the Twenty-Five Years' Realignment, driven by the cross-cutting issues of America's recent "culture wars," as discussed earlier in this analysis, resulted in a loosening of the Buckeye State's presidential correlation patterns since the early 1960s. See Table 7. The .96 correlation between Adlai Stevenson's 1952 and 1956 Democratic presidential campaigns is the last such high coefficient until a strong, consistent pattern returns in the mid-1980s, toward the end of the latest national realignment.<sup>57</sup> President Clinton's Ohio re-election pattern in 1996 correlates at a high .97 with the 2000 pattern of Clinton's vice president, Gore, a configuration that is matched in the Gore/Kerry correlation as discussed above.

Examination of the correlation of two elections separated by several decades allows one to isolate shifts in county-level partisan support over time. This is done in the scattergram in Figure 6 for the .66 Ohio correlation of John F. Kennedy in 1960 with another Massachusetts senator, Kerry, in 2004. (Incidentally, Kennedy lost Ohio in 1960 to Vice President Richard

Nixon with 46.7 percent to Nixon's 53.3 percent.) Several striking changes jump out from the scattergram. Franklin county is strongly in the Democratic camp in 2004, but this populous seat of state government and Ohio State University was solidly Republican in 1960. The same is true for Athens county, home of Ohio University, now one of the Democratic party's strongest counties. Stark county (Canton) and Montgomery county (Dayton) also gave Kerry slim majorities that they denied Kennedy forty-four years earlier. In the lower center-left of the scattergram are a group of counties that were much more supportive of Kennedy in 1960 than they were of Kerry in 2004. Mercer and Putnam, two sparsely populated counties in the northwestern part of the state, are extreme cases, but two more-populous counties near Cincinnati, Butler and Clermont, also followed the pattern.

In the upper right part of the scattergram are found the strongest Democratic counties, most of which increased their Democratic support in 2004 compared to 1960. For example, Cuyahoga went from 59.6 percent for Kennedy to 66.6 percent for Kerry, and Lucas (Toledo) went from 52.1 percent for Kennedy to 60.2 percent for Kerry. Two exceptions were the upper Ohio River counties of Jefferson and Belmont, which saw their Democratic majorities decline somewhat. Also, Lake county, northeast of Cleveland, went from 51.1 percent for Kennedy to 48.5 percent for Kerry. Many other fascinating shifts, too numerous to mention individually, are visible throughout this revealing scattergram.

The 2006 elections in Ohio marked a stunning recovery for the state's Democratic party,<sup>58</sup> reshaping partisan expectations for Ohio in the 2008 presidential election. Democrats captured the governorship in a landslide when Congressman Ted Strickland defeated Ken Blackwell, the GOP secretary of state, with 60.4 percent of the vote to the Republican gubernatorial nominee's 36.8 percent. In a second major statewide turnaround, Democratic

Congressman Sherrod Brown defeated U.S. Senator Mike DeWine, the Republican incumbent who was seeking a third term, with 55.9 percent of the vote to DeWine's 44.1 percent.

Brown's victory was one of a series of Democratic successes nationwide that allowed the Democrats narrowly to win control of the U.S. Senate in 2006 to go along with the party's decisive recapture of the U.S. House. Ohio contributed to the U.S. House result when the GOP lost the seat held by U.S. Representative Bob Ney, who resigned from Congress after pleading guilty to corruption charges arising out of the Jack Abramoff national lobbying scandal. Three other Republican congressional incumbents in Ohio narrowly turned back spirited Democratic challengers in 2006. For details on the 2006 U.S. House results in Ohio, see Tom Diemer's Chapter 12 in *Ohio Politics*.

In addition, Ohio Democrats captured three of the four statewide constitutional offices in 2006 and gained seven seats in the Ohio House and one in the Ohio Senate, although the GOP continued in control of both houses of the state legislature. Marc Dann, a Democratic state senator from Youngstown, was narrowly elected attorney general, defeating state Auditor Betty Montgomery, a former, two-term Republican attorney general.<sup>59</sup> Democrat Jennifer Brunner, a former Franklin county Common Pleas Court judge, was elected secretary of state, and Democrat Richard Cordray, Franklin county's treasurer, was elected state treasurer. The lone Republican victory came in the state auditor's race, in which Republican Mary Taylor of Green narrowly defeated Democrat Barbara Sykes of Akron.<sup>60</sup> Both women were members of the Ohio House. Despite notable Democratic gains in the Ohio House, the Republican party maintained a 53-to-46 majority after the election and a 21-to-12 margin in the Senate. See Brian Usher and Andrew Lucker's Chapter 14 in *Ohio Politics* for recent state legislative trends.

Strickland, an ordained United Methodist minister and a psychologist in addition to being a seven-term congressman from southeastern Ohio, repeatedly sought in the fall campaign to link his Republican opponent to unpopular, outgoing Governor Bob Taft and to GOP scandals,<sup>61</sup> especially one involving a party fund-raiser, Tom Noe, who was convicted for embezzling from a state investment in rare coins.<sup>62</sup> See Joe Hallett's Chapter 11 in *Ohio Politics* for an account of the woes Governor Taft encountered in his last years in office, problems that contributed to a pro-Democratic voting trend in Ohio in 2006.

Blackwell, in the words of a *Washington Post* reporter, “ran as a pure social conservative, emphasizing issues important to the Christian right.”<sup>63</sup> In reaction, a prominent group of moderate Ohio Republicans endorsed Strickland. The group's leader, Charles (Rocky) Saxbe, a Columbus attorney and son of a former U.S. senator, argued that Blackwell's positions did not “represent the mainstream of the Republican Party . . . I don't think any right-thinking Republican believes that people who are supporting choice [on abortion] are murderers or that people who support gay rights or who are gay are somehow ill-equipped to enjoy the privileges of citizenry in this state.”<sup>64</sup>

In the campaign, Strickland focused on education and jobs, promising to “Turn Around Ohio.” Blackwell charged that Strickland planned to raise taxes, putting the point this way in their Youngstown debate: “The first thing I do when a Washington politician says anything about turning around—I turn around and grab my wallet, because what they are talking about is taking taxes from us when we need to cut taxes and grow the economy.”

“My opponent is just flat-out wrong,” Strickland countered. “I do not intend to raise taxes.” Instead, Strickland said that, in the words of a *Plain Dealer* reporter, “he will pay for his economic and other proposals largely by streamlining state government.”<sup>65</sup>

Brown capitalized on a series of national issues that worked against incumbent Republicans in Congress across the country in the 2006 elections, including the increased unpopularity of the Iraq war, President Bush's high disapproval rating, and, especially in Ohio, unease over the future of the economy and distress at persistent job losses. The *New York Times* conservative columnist, David Brooks, captured the essence of Brown's campaign well in a mid-October column, arguing that the U.S. Senate campaign in Ohio was a "prequel" to the 2008 national elections. Calling Brown "a full-bore economic populist," Brooks wrote:

He focuses on the problem that is at the core of his career and mission: the hollowing out of Ohio's manufacturing base and the slow destruction of a way of life.

"They've sold out our country and betrayed the middle class," he says of the Republicans and the big corporations who worked together to write the tax laws, the energy bill and the prescription drug bill.

He vociferously opposes free trade. In his defining TV ad, he stands in front of a closed factory and blasts DeWine for supporting trade agreements that cost America jobs. . . . At a time when many Democrats are merely against things, Brown has a coherent approach to globalization and stagnant wages.<sup>66</sup>

Noting his independence from the Bush White House, DeWine placed heavy emphasis in the campaign on his experience in Washington, his ability to work toward bipartisan solutions to problems, and his proven track record for channeling federal dollars to Ohio. To quote again from the Brooks column, DeWine "rattles off statistics on how many Ohio jobs derive from exports and global trade. If Ohio's going to rebound, he says, it's going to come from skills and entrepreneurialism not trade protection."<sup>67</sup>

Further insight into the two major Ohio statewide elections of 2006 can be gained by examining the results of the exit polls in both contests.<sup>68</sup> Table 8 indicates that New Deal-style differences among income groups persist, although both Brown and Strickland did better among higher income Ohioans than did Senator Kerry in 2004; see Table 1 for the Kerry comparison.

Examining partisan identification and the 2006 vote in Table 9 reveals that Democrats were more faithful to their nominees than were Republicans. Twenty percent of self-identified Republicans voted for Strickland, an amazing defection rate that is suggestive of the disaffection in GOP ranks with Blackwell's hard-right stances. Independents broke two-to-one for the Democrats. Note that 40 percent of all Ohio voters surveyed in 2006 claimed affiliation with the Democratic party, a five-percentage-point increase over the 2004 party-identification findings displayed in Table 2. Republican identification registered at 37 percent in 2006, down three-percentage points from two years earlier.

Table 10 shows the vote by race, indicating that Blackwell, who is an African American, did somewhat better than Republicans generally do among Ohio's African Americans, but at 20 percent he clearly failed to make the large in-roads he had suggested might be possible because of his candidacy.<sup>69</sup> DeWine received 15 percent of the votes of African Americans. The bulk of the African-American voters supported the two Democratic nominees, a continuation of a decades-old partisan pattern.

Table 11 reveals the impact of the employment issue on the choices of Ohio voters in 2006. Respondents were asked about the job situation in their area compared to two years ago. A stunning 47 percent said the situation was worse, and, of those who said so, 77 percent voted for Brown and 80 percent for Strickland. Seventeen percent of the exit-poll sample said that the job situation was better in their area, and they voted heavily for DeWine (77 percent) and

Blackwell (72 percent). The 34 percent who said the job situation was about the same differed in their partisan preferences between the two races; Strickland won 55 percent of them, but DeWine won almost as many at 54 percent.

The impact of the Iraq war on the 2006 vote in Ohio is shown in Table 12. Respondents were asked, “How do you feel about the U.S. war in Iraq?” Fifty-six percent said they disapproved, and of them, 82 percent voted for Brown. Of the 43 percent who approved of the war, 77 percent voted for DeWine. Similar findings were found in the governor’s race. In the exit poll, respondents had the option of saying whether they “strongly” or “somewhat” approved or disapproved of the war. As Table 12 further shows, those selecting the “strongly disapprove” position—37 percent of the sample—voted 90 percent for Brown and 89 percent for Strickland!

Examination of the county-by-county patterns reveals that Strickland and Brown did not draw support in exactly the same way throughout the state, which is not surprising given that their political roots are from quite different parts of the Ohio. Brown, originally from Mansfield, represented a congressional district in the more highly developed northeastern part of Ohio, while Strickland’s political base was centered in the rural, small-town counties along or near the Ohio River in the southern part of the state. Their county-level patterns correlate at .91. Brown’s county configuration more closely mirrored the Democratic presidential voting pattern visible in 2000 and 2004 in the Buckeye State. For example, Brown correlates with Kerry at .96, but Strickland and Kerry correlate at .87.

A scattergram of the Strickland/Kerry correlation pinpoints the many rural, small-town, predominantly Republican counties where the Democratic gubernatorial victor far outperformed the Massachusetts senator two years earlier. See Figure 7. As Mark Naymik, a *Plain Dealer* reporter, noted in an article headlined, “Strickland Courted Rural Ohio; It Paid Off,” Strickland

focused special attention on these counties while, at the same time, repeatedly visiting all of Ohio's major urban areas: "Often bragging about his rural roots, Strickland reached voters [in Ohio's rural counties] through small-town newspaper stories generated by his frequent visits. He ran radio ads on Christian radio stations, in which he talked about his faith, and bombarded rural mailboxes with fliers highlighting his pro-gun position." Strickland's campaign manager, Aaron Pickrell, told Naymik that his candidate did not expect to win majorities in many of these counties, but rather to appeal to voters there who he said were ignored by the Democratic party in past elections. "We established a road map that a lot of candidates can use," Pickrell asserted. "Don't leave any votes on the table."<sup>70</sup>

The strong Democratic showing in Ohio in 2006 is reflected in the David party-strength index in Figure 1, which is displayed at the beginning of my paper. This index of Democratic strength, which, as stated above, averages the vote for governor, U.S. senator, and all U.S. House seats in each election year, shot up from 45.2 percent in 2004 to 56.5 percent in 2006, carrying the Democrats above the 50-percent line for the first time since 1990.<sup>71</sup> In fact, the 2006 figure is the third highest such percentage recorded in one hundred and thirty-four years, that is, since 1872.

### **The 2008 Presidential Election in Ohio: Who Will Win?**

After completing this lengthy, multifarious journey through well over a century of Ohio and national electoral change, what do the historical and analytical perspectives covered above, coupled with latest polls and other current indicators, suggest for the voting this coming November? As I examine the current campaign, the weight of the evidence convinces me that Barack Obama will carry Ohio on November 4 and will likely win the presidency.

At this moment in the campaign (Sunday, September 21), the Ohio polls are inconclusive. Some show Senator McCain with a narrow lead, such as the University of Cincinnati's mid-September Ohio Poll. Others put Senator Obama ahead, such as the mid-September Marist College poll. The most impressive mid-September poll, the Big Ten Battleground Poll, conducted by a team of political scientists and led by two scholars at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, finds the "horserace" at 45.6 percent for Obama and his running mate, Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware, and at 45.1 percent for McCain and his running mate, Gov. Sarah Palin of Alaska. (Surveys usually don't report their results to one decimal point, but, given the close results that the Big Ten researchers found in most of the eight states they surveyed, one can understand their decision to try to be as precise as possible. Among likely Ohio voters in their sample, the division was 282 Ohioans for the Democratic ticket versus 279 for the Republican ticket!) Incidentally, the organizers of the Big Ten Battleground Poll go into the field only twice—in mid-September and in late October, making their poll an important one to watch right before Election Day.<sup>72</sup>

The surveys do give us other valuable information apart from the close "horserace" results. For example, they tell us that there is great dissatisfaction in the nation and in Ohio concerning the direction in which the country is going. The *New York Times*/CBS News national poll, conducted September 12 to 16, asked: "Do you feel things in this country are generally going in the right direction or do you feel things have pretty seriously gotten off on the wrong track?" Eight-one percent of the sample picked "the wrong track." The Big Ten Ohio poll worded the question this way: "Thinking about things in the United States, do you think things in the country are generally going in the right direction, or do you feel things have gotten

off on the wrong track?” Seventy-six percent of the Ohio respondents selected “the wrong track.”

Further, the polls continue to find that only a little over a quarter of the country’s citizens approve of the way President Bush’s is performing his job: 27 percent in the latest *NYT*/CBS News poll and 29 percent in the University of Cincinnati’s Ohio Poll conducted early this past summer.

These results make for an extremely difficult environment for the Republican presidential nominee. No matter how hard the Arizona Republican tries to distance himself from the incumbent president of his own party by emphasizing that he has been a maverick within his own party and an independent thinker, the reality remains that a fellow Republican, President Bush, is in office at a time when a large proportion of the country holds a negative view of the nation’s direction and of Bush’s performance in office.

We know that the “aftershocks” of the Twenty-Five Years’ Realignment have given us a finely balanced division of “red” and “blue” states as was evident in the close and stable 2000 and 2004 presidential results. Of the Great Lakes states, all of which have been hard hit by the decline of our industrial base in the new global economy, only Ohio and Indiana have stayed Republican in the last two presidential elections. While the current Indiana polls, such as the Big Ten poll in the Hoosier State, give Senator McCain roughly a three-percentage-point edge in mid-September, the mere fact that Senator Obama is even competitive in a state that hasn’t voted for a Democratic national standard-bearer since 1964 is quite remarkable.

For Ohio, the closeness of the presidential race reflects the pro-Democratic trend manifested here in November 2006. Ohio is catching up with its Rust Belt neighbors as the new party system formed between 1964/1965 and 1988/1989 continues to work its way into the

politics of individual states. As shown above, the Ohio Democratic party was late to benefit fully from the New Deal realignment. Likewise, it appears to be just now accommodating itself to the “aftershocks” of the latest reshuffling, a process that has propelled so many similar states, like Michigan and Illinois, firmly into the Democratic fold during the first decade of the Twenty-First Century.

The Ohio GOP is still a formidable force, highly skilled at winning national elections in the Buckeye State. But, the current environment as well as the long-term trends are working against the Republican party this year. In a state hard-hit by plant closings and the overall loss of jobs, it is not surprising that 43 percent of the Ohio respondents in the recent Marist College poll said “the economy” is the most important issue to them in deciding how to vote for president this year. Among this group, the Obama-Biden ticket had a sizeable edge. Another nine percent of likely voters said “health care” was their most important issue; the vast majority of them said they favored the Democratic slate.

Of those who picked “security against terrorism” (11 percent of the sample) or “social issues like abortion or same-sex marriage” (11 percent), the McCain-Palin ticket was the overwhelming choice. Given the nature of the post-Twenty-Five Years’ Realignment party system, those results are not surprising. However, the percentages of Ohioans opting for these “Republican issues” in 2008 lag far behind in relative terms to those who say they are chiefly motivated in their presidential vote by economic and health care concerns, issues that have been central to the campaign of the Democrats this year.

Two things that I have not mentioned so far are potential problems for Senator Obama and need to be addressed. Both of them have counterparts in the 1960 presidential election, which, in my view, is the best model for this year’s contest. Coming into the fall debates, John

Kennedy was widely viewed as too inexperienced compared to his Republican opponent, Vice President Richard Nixon, who was just then completing his eighth year in the nation's second spot and who had considerable foreign policy experience.

Furthermore, no Catholic had ever been elected president, and anti-Catholic bias was clearly present in the electorate. Before Kennedy won the Democratic nomination, only one other Catholic had been nominated for president, the Democrat Al Smith, whose unsuccessful 1928 candidacy resulted in a voter upheaval linked to the religious issue.<sup>73</sup> Kennedy confronted the issue head-on during the fall campaign. For example, addressing a group of Protestant ministers in Houston, he asserted in September 1960: "I am not the Catholic candidate for President. I am the Democratic Party's candidate for President, who happens also to be a Catholic. I do not speak for my church on public matters—and the church does not speak for me. . . . If this election is decided on the basis that 40,000,000 Americans lost their chance of being President on the day they were baptized, then it is the whole nation that will be the loser in the eyes of Catholics and non-Catholics around the world, in the eyes of history, and in the eyes of our people."<sup>74</sup>

As the first African American nominee for president, Senator Obama faces a similar challenge to the one Kennedy confronted forty-eight years ago. Racial division in this country is not as prevalent as it was during the Twenty-Five Years' Realignment. Yet, everyone understands that we have not yet arrived at a color-blind society. The ideal was established in the stirring words of Martin Luther King at the end of his famous "I Have a Dream" speech in August 1963 in front of the Lincoln Memorial in Washington: "I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia the sons of former slaves and the sons of former slave-owners will be able to sit together at the table of brotherhood. . . . And when this happens . . . we will be able to

speed up that day when all of God's children, black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles, Protestants and Catholics, will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old Negro spiritual, 'Free at last! Free at last! Thank God Almighty, we are free at last!'

<sup>75</sup>

Analysis of the results of the 1960 election tells us that Kennedy, in winning a narrow victory, lost several million Protestant votes that a Democratic nominee should have received had anti-Catholic bias not been present. At the same time, Kennedy's candidacy mobilized several million Catholics to vote Democratic, a surge in the electorate motivated by his religion. A recently published book on the 1960 election notes that the effect of the Catholic issue on the outcome is "difficult to unravel." Still, the author relied on a study conducted at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology that concluded: "[R]eligion may have cost Kennedy as many as 1.5 million votes, or 2.3 percent, and given to Nixon the states of California, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Tennessee. At the same time, however, the same study concluded that Kennedy won—because of his religion—the heavily weighted Catholic states of New York, Connecticut, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, giving him a net gain of 22 electoral votes as a direct result of the religious issue."<sup>76</sup>

In addition, Kennedy overcame the "experience issue" after his stellar performance in the four televised presidential debates held that fall, the first such encounters in American history. Nixon did well, too, after initially encountering some difficulties in the first debate related mainly to his appearance. Still, because Kennedy was able to hold his own against the perceived "more experienced" vice president, the Massachusetts Democrat put to rest an important question about his candidacy. Likewise, as we have seen, the Catholic issue, in the end, was probably a slight plus in the electoral vote for Kennedy.

The three upcoming 2008 presidential debates may well allow Senator Obama, whose meteoric rise in national politics has occurred in less than four years, to neutralize the “experience” issue much as Kennedy did. Of course, Senator McCain, at 72, the oldest first-time nominee of a major party, has a potential “age” problem that Nixon, just four years older than the 43-year-old Kennedy, did not face.

Will racial prejudice deny Senator Obama the White House? There is no doubt that, just as occurred with anti-Catholic bias in 1960, there are likely to be several million white voters who will not vote for the Democrat because of his race. On the other hand, these votes are likely to be offset by an unprecedented mobilization at the polls of African Americans as well as racially liberal whites, idealistic young people, and Hispanic Americans who are favorably disposed to Obama’s historic, precedent-breaking candidacy. Even if anti-black bias is the stronger force in 2008, which I doubt, its effect may well be countered by the other strong pro-Democratic tendencies present this year, which I have already discussed above, namely the poor state of the economy (not to mention the financial crisis on Wall Street) at the end of an eight-year GOP presidency, the high unfavorable public rating of the incumbent Republican president, and a strong feeling among the voters that the country is on the “wrong track.”

With all of these factors at work in our battleground state, I expect Ohio to join its “blue” state regional neighbors and continue the strong Democratic trend exhibited in the 2006 election here by giving its twenty electoral votes to Barack Obama. Thus, if Ohio’s electoral votes end up determining the 2008 outcome, as occurred four years ago, Senator Obama will be our next president.

Table 1 Exit Poll Estimates of the Vote for President  
by Income in Ohio and the Nation in 2004

	<i>Ohio</i>		<i>Nation</i>			
	<i>Bush</i>	<i>Kerry</i>	<i>Bush</i>	<i>Kerry</i>	<i>Nader</i>	
Under \$15,000 (7%)	29%	71%	Under \$15,000 (8%)	36%	63%	0%
\$15-30,000 (16%)	37%	63%	\$15-30,000 (15%)	42%	57%	0%
\$30-50,000 (25%)	49%	50%	\$30-50,000 (22%)	49%	50%	0%
\$50-75,000 (22%)	58%	41%	\$50-75,000 (23%)	56%	43%	0%
\$75-100,000 (15%)	55%	45%	\$75-100,000 (14%)	55%	45%	0%
\$100-150,000 (9%)	58%	42%	\$100-150,000 (11%)	57%	42%	1%
\$150-200,000 (4%)	63%	37%	\$150-200,000 (4%)	58%	42%	*
Over \$200,000 (2%)	*	*	Over \$200,000 (3%)	63%	35%	1%

\* Represents a statistically insignificant number of respondents.

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SOURCE: The 2004 exit polls were conducted by Edison Media Research and Mitofsky International for the Associated Press, CNN, Fox News, ABC, NBC, and CBS. To find information on the construction of the polls or to view the questionnaires used, visit the main Internet Web site for the exit polls: <http://www.exit-poll.net>. There were 2,020 respondents for the Ohio exit poll and 13,660 respondents for the national exit poll.

Table 2 Exit Poll Estimates of the Vote for President  
by Party Identification in Ohio and the Nation in 2004

	<i>Ohio</i>		<i>Nation</i>			
	<i>Bush</i>	<i>Kerry</i>	<i>Bush</i>	<i>Kerry</i>	<i>Nader</i>	
Democrat (35%)	9%	90%	Democrat (37%)	11%	89%	0%
Republican (40%)	94%	6%	Republican (37%)	93%	6%	0%
Independent (25%)	40%	59%	Independent (26%)	48%	49%	1%

SOURCE: See source note in Table 1.

Table 3 Exit Poll Estimates of the Vote for President

## by Ideology in Ohio and the Nation in 2004

	<i>Ohio</i>		<i>Nation</i>			
	<i>Bush</i>	<i>Kerry</i>	<i>Bush</i>	<i>Kerry</i>	<i>Nader</i>	
Liberal (19%)	14%	85%	Liberal (21%)	13%	85%	1%
Moderate (47%)	41%	59%	Moderate (45%)	45%	54%	0%
Conservative (34%)	87%	13%	Conservative (34%)	84%	15%	0%

SOURCE: See source note in Table 1.

Table 4 Exit Poll Estimates of the Vote for President  
by a Family's Financial Situation as Compared to Four Years Earlier  
in Ohio and the Nation in 2004

	<i>Ohio</i>		<i>Nation</i>			
	<i>Bush</i>	<i>Kerry</i>	<i>Bush</i>	<i>Kerry</i>	<i>Nader</i>	
Better (29%)	87%	13%	Better (32%)	80%	19%	0%
Worse (32%)	15%	85%	Worse (28%)	20%	79%	0%
Same (37%)	55%	45%	Same (39%)	49%	50%	1%

SOURCE: See source note in Table 1.

Table 5 Exit Poll Estimates of the Vote for President  
by How the Respondent Feels about the U.S. Decision to Go to War in Iraq

as Tabulated in Ohio and the Nation in 2004

	<i>Ohio</i>		<i>Nation</i>			
	<i>Bush</i>	<i>Kerry</i>	<i>Bush</i>	<i>Kerry</i>	<i>Nader</i>	
Strongly Approve (30%)	91%	9%	Strongly Approve (29%)	94%	6%	0%
Somewhat Approve (26%)	74%	25%	Somewhat Approve (23%)	75%	24%	1%
Somewhat Disapprove (15%)	22%	78%	Somewhat Disapprove (15%)	25%	73%	1%
Strongly Disapprove (27%)	3%	96%	Strongly Disapprove (31%)	5%	94%	0%

SOURCE: See source note in Table 1.

Table 6 Exit Poll Estimates of the Vote for President  
by Which One Issue of Seven Mattered the Most to the Respondent  
in Deciding How to Vote in Ohio and the Nation in 2004

	<i>Ohio</i>		<i>Nation</i>			
	<i>Bush</i>	<i>Kerry</i>	<i>Bush</i>	<i>Kerry</i>	<i>Nader</i>	
Taxes (6%)	62%	38%	Taxes (5%)	57%	43%	0%
Education (5%)	32%	66%	Education (4%)	26%	73%	*
Iraq (13%)	28%	72%	Iraq (15%)	26%	73%	0%
Terrorism (17%)	90%	10%	Terrorism (19%)	86%	14%	0%
Economy/Jobs (24%)	17%	83%	Economy/Jobs (20%)	18%	80%	0%
Moral Values (23%)	85%	14%	Moral Values (22%)	80%	18%	1%
Health Care (5%)	25%	75%	Health Care (8%)	23%	77%	*

\* Represents a statistically insignificant number of respondents.

SOURCE: See source note in Table 1.

Table 7  
Correlations of the Democratic Vote for President in Ohio, 1952-2004

9	0	0	8	3	3	6	8	8	7	2	3	2	0	0
0		0	8	2	6	6	8	8	7	0	0	2	0	6
0			0	0	8	8	0	8	9	3	0	7	3	6
0				0	9	8	0	9	7	0	0	2	0	6
0					0	0	9	8	8	0	0	8	0	3
0						0	8	9	6	8	9	8	8	8
0							0	9	0	8	8	8	8	3
0								0	0	8	8	8	8	8
0									0	9	9	9	9	0
0										0	9	9	9	0
0											0	0	9	0
0													0	9
0														0

Table 8  
Exit Poll Estimates of the Vote for U.S. Senator and Governor in Ohio by Income in 2006

Income	<i>U.S. Senate</i>		Income	<i>Governor</i>	
	DeWine	Brown		Blackwell	Strickland
Under \$15,000 (7%)	28%	72%	Under \$15,000 (7%)	27%	72%
\$15-30,000 (14%)	36%	64%	\$15-30,000 (15%)	32%	66%
\$30-50,000 (23%)	42%	58%	\$30-50,000 (23%)	36%	60%
\$50-75,000 (24%)	45%	55%	\$50-75,000 (24%)	36%	63%
\$75-100,000 (14%)	50%	50%	\$75-100,000 (14%)	41%	55%
\$100-150,000 (9%)	47%	53%	\$100-150,000 (9%)	36%	59%
\$150-200,000 (3%)	48%	52%	\$150-200,000 (3%)	40%	56%
Over \$200,000 (5%)	56%	44%	Over \$200,000 (5%)	46%	52%

*Source:* The 2006 exit polls were conducted by Edison Media Research and Mitofsky International for the Associated Press, CNN, Fox News, ABC, NBC, and CBS. There were 2,293 respondents in the Ohio exit poll. For the wording of the questionnaire as well as the responses to all the questions, consult the Internet Web sites of any of the sponsors. An especially full presentation of the 2006 Ohio exit-poll results was available at <http://www.msnbc.msn.com>.

Table 9  
Exit Poll Estimates of the Vote for U.S. Senator and Governor in Ohio by Party Identification in 2006

<i>U.S. Senate</i>			<i>Governor</i>		
Party	DeWine	Brown	Party	Blackwell	Strickland
Democrat (40%)	9%	91%	Democrat (40%)	6%	92%
Republican (37%)	86%	14%	Republican (37%)	77%	20%
Independent (23%)	35%	65%	Independent (23%)	26%	69%

SOURCE: See source note in Table 8.

Table 10  
Exit Poll Estimates of the Vote for U.S. Senator and Governor in Ohio by Race in 2006

<i>U.S. Senate</i>			<i>Governor</i>		
Race	DeWine	Brown	Race	Blackwell	Strickland
White (84%)	48%	52%	White (84%)	40%	58%
African-American (12%)	15%	85%	African-American (12%)	20%	77%

SOURCE: See source note in Table 8

Table 11  
Exit Poll Estimates of the Vote for U.S. Senator and Governor in Ohio in 2006 by the Respondent's Perception of the Job Situation in His/Her Area as Compared to Two Years Ago

<i>U.S. Senate</i>			<i>Governor</i>		
Job Situation	DeWine	Brown	Job Situation	Blackwell	Strickland
Better (17%)	77%	23%	Better (17%)	72%	25%
Worse (47%)	23%	77%	Worse (47%)	18%	80%
About the Same (34%)	54%	46%	About the Same (34%)	44%	55%

SOURCE: See source note in Table 8.

Table 12  
Exit Poll Estimates of the Vote for U.S. Senator and Governor in Ohio in 2006 by How the Respondent Feels about the U.S. War in Iraq

<i>U.S. Senate</i>			<i>Governor</i>		
U.S. War in Iraq	DeWine	Brown	U.S. War in Iraq	Blackwell	Strickland
Approve (43%)	77%	23%	Approve (43%)	65%	32%
Strongly Approve (18%)	84%	16%	Strongly Approve (18%)	81%	17%
Somewhat Approve (25%)	72%	28%	Somewhat Approve (25%)	54%	42%
Disapprove (56%)	18%	82%	Disapprove (56%)	15%	83%
Somewhat Disapprove (19%)	33%	67%	Somewhat Disapprove (19%)	26%	70%
Strongly Disapprove (37%)	10%	90%	Strongly Disapprove (37%)	9%	89%

SOURCE: See source note in Table 8.

Figure 1: Democratic Party Strength in Ohio, 1872-2006





Figure 2: Democratic Party Strength in the North, 1872-2006



**Figure 3: Democratic Party Strength in the South, 1872-2006**




Figure 5. Scattergram of the Democratic Vote for President in Ohio in 2000 and 2004

Figure 6. Scattergram of the Democratic Vote for President in Ohio in 1960 and 2004

Figure 7. Scattergram of the Democratic Vote for President in Ohio in 2004 and Governor in 2006

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<sup>1</sup> The list of “closest” states has varied in pre-election polls, but these eleven, along with Ohio, have been consistently in the category: Colorado, Florida, Missouri, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Virginia.

<sup>2</sup> Paul T. David, *Party Strength in the United States 1872-1970* (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1972). Professor David updated his party-strength figures for 1972 to 1976 in three *Journal of Politics* research notes. Before his death in 1994, David left an endowment to the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) to have the index updated and made available to researchers as part of the consortium’s vast data holding. Professor William Claggett of Florida State University, who assisted the consortium with the updating, kindly made the figures for 1976 to 1994 available to me with the permission of the consortium. Andrew M. Lucker, who received his Ph.D. in political science from Case Western Reserve University in 1998, has updated the figures for me through 2006. He also prepared the three fine figures used in this chapter displaying David’s index, for which I am appreciative. Incidentally, David actually offers three variations of his index; the one I use here he labeled Composite B.

<sup>3</sup> All of a state's U.S. House elections are averaged to make up that office's one-third contribution to the biennial figure, all House races thus being equal to the statewide percentages for each of every state's two major statewide elections—for governor and U.S. senator. In order to have a figure for governor and senator every two years, David employs interpolation, averaging the preceding and following elections when there is no election for either of these offices. Because one is always looking to the following election when there is no election for governor or senator, the figures for the most recent election are only tentative and have to be updated after the next

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election is held, unless there were elections for both governor and senator, as occurred in Ohio in 2006.

<sup>4</sup> In constructing the northern and southern figures, the state figures are weighted roughly according to population. This is done by using the number of members of the U.S. House each state is allotted, a weight that, of course, changes every ten years when seats are reallocated by Congress to reflect population shifts measured by the U.S. census. Incidentally, the South is defined as the eleven states of the former Confederacy plus Kentucky and Oklahoma. The other 37 states make up the North.

<sup>5</sup> V. O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics*, XXI (February 1955), 4.

<sup>6</sup> For an excellent recent history of the concept, see Theodore Rosenof, *Realignment: The Theory that Change the Way We Think about American Politics* (Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).

<sup>7</sup> James L. Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States*, rev. ed. (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1983).

<sup>8</sup> James MacGregor Burns, *The Workshop of Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 205.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 233.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> George W. Knepper, *Ohio and Its People*, Bicentennial ed. (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2003).

<sup>12</sup> One major deviation during the period resulted from the titanic Republican schism of 1912.

The split between President William Howard Taft of Ohio, the Republican nominee, and the former Republican president Theodore Roosevelt, the nominee of the Progressive (Bull Moose)

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party, allowed the Democratic presidential standard-bearer, Woodrow Wilson, a one-term progressive governor of New Jersey and a native southerner, to win the White House. It was only the Democratic party's third presidential victory since 1856.

<sup>13</sup> Burns, *Workshop of Democracy*, 486

<sup>14</sup> Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System*, 210.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> James MacGregor Burns, *The Crosswinds of Freedom* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 75.

<sup>17</sup> Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System*, 213.

<sup>18</sup> Burns, *Crosswinds of Freedom*, 86 (italics removed).

<sup>19</sup> When major changes sweep over the party system, they never erase everything in their path. Sundquist illustrated the point with his marvelous "overlay" analogy that deserves full quotation: "In every new alignment of the party system, then, there will be large, perhaps dominant, elements carried over from the old. Successive realignments can be best understood as new patterns drawn on transparent overlays. Each overlay defines a new line of party cleavage within the electorate (or redelineates an old line) and so distributes some elements of the voting population on either side of that line in new arrangements. But beneath the latest overlay can be discerned all the lines of cleavage of the past, some more distinct than others by virtue of their recency or the strength of the color in which they were originally drawn" (p. 17). Sensitivity to this residue of history is useful when trying to sort out the full impact of a new realignment on the previous patterns. After the New Deal "earthquake" the most important "cleavage of the past" that stood out in bold relief was, of course, the continued persistence of the one-party Democratic South dedicated to the preservation of the post-Reconstruction racial status quo.

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<sup>20</sup> The pre-Rooseveltian Democratic party was quite different, as partly captured in this acidic 1931 commentary in the *Nation*: "[The Democratic party] differs from the G.O.P. only in that its desire to become the party of privilege has never been satisfied . . . . Essentially there is no difference between the two major parties except that the bankers and businessmen have found the Republicans more dependable." Quoted in Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System*, 205. Although the *Nation's* characterization of the pre-1932 Democrats is an exaggeration, it does serve to emphasize the break wrought by FDR's New Deal activism. For more on the complexities of the Democratic party as it entered the new era, see Douglas B. Craig, *After Wilson: The Struggle for the Democratic Party, 1920-1934* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992). Incidentally, the term "those who have less" is borrowed from V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), 307.

<sup>21</sup> Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System*, 240-268 (chapter 11).

<sup>22</sup> Sundquist elaborated on the problem: "The Democrats who rode into positions of power on the crest of the Roosevelt tide lacked the appeal, the public respect, the motivation, and the competence that would have enabled them to quickly consolidate the support the party had temporarily gained in the early 1930s. The leadership was too old or too conservative to appeal to Roosevelt supporters, or more deeply committed to the party's patronage than to its program, or all of these. . . . The Democratic party in many states was still too Catholic to appeal to the Protestant majority, and it was too urban to appeal to the rural and small-town population."

Ibid., 262.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 267.

<sup>24</sup> On this situation, Theodore H. White wrote: "Time was, forty years ago, when Negroes voted solidly Republican out of gratitude to Abraham Lincoln and emancipation. ('I remember,' once

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said Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 'when I was young in Kansas City, the kids threw rocks at Negroes on our street who dared to vote Democratic.') But Franklin D. Roosevelt changed that. Under Roosevelt, government came to mean social security, relief, strong unions, unemployment compensation. ('Let Jesus lead me, and welfare feed me' was a Negro depression chant.) And, like a heaving-off of ancient habit, as the Negro moved north he moved on to the Democratic voting rolls." White, *The Making of the President 1960* (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1961), 232.

<sup>25</sup> Robert A. Garson, *The Democratic Party and the Politics of Sectionalism, 1941-1948* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), 278.

<sup>26</sup> The full story is told in Alexander P. Lamis, *The Two-Party South*, 2<sup>nd</sup> expanded ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) and Alexander P. Lamis, ed., *Southern Politics in the 1990s* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1999).

<sup>27</sup> For example, David's index of Democratic party strength for the nation in 2000 was 48.9 percent, dipping slightly to 47.1 percent in 2002, rebounding to 49.2 percent in 2004, and measuring 52.4 in the preliminary 2006 calculations.

<sup>28</sup> Thomas Byrne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, *Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 3-31.

<sup>29</sup> I first wrote about "the Twenty-Five Years' Realignment" in my concluding chapter to my 1999 edited book, *Southern Politics in the 1990s*.

<sup>30</sup> The term refers to the post-Civil War era use of memories of the deadly sectional conflict by northern Republicans and southern Democrats to remind the faithful of their underlying hatred for the other side.

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<sup>31</sup> The three issues in the quotation marks are from Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System*, 376. In his chapter "Years of Disruption: Crosscutting Issues Nationwide" (pp. 376-411), Sundquist offers an excellent overview of the conflicts of the time. The term used to describe the domestic side of the turmoil—"Social Issue"—was coined by Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg in their book *The Real Majority: An Extraordinary Examination of the American Electorate* (New York: Cowan-McCann, 1970).

<sup>32</sup> For a fine narrative account of the origins of these cleavages, see James T. Patterson, *Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 637-77 (Chap. 21). Patterson entitles this chapter of his excellent book "Rights, Polarization, and Backlash, 1966-1967."

<sup>33</sup> Edsall and Edsall, *Chain Reaction*, 5. In a prescient book, *The Hidden Crisis in American Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), Samuel Lubell captured the essence of what was happening. Although his book also delineated the new nonracial cleavages, he concluded: "The New Deal coalition has not collapsed in one heap . . . but broke down at one enormously important point, that of racial conflict." (p. 29). Years later, other researchers—using an array of statistical data—have substantiated Lubell's quick contemporary assessment. See, for example, Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, *Race and the Transformation of American Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).

<sup>34</sup> Jack W. Germond and Jules Witcover, *Whose Broad Stripes and Bright Stars?: The Trivial Pursuit of the Presidency 1988* (New York: Warner Books, 1989), 10. For a full, insightful discussion of the Willie Horton TV ad and what it epitomized in American politics, see Dan T. Carter, *From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution, 1963-1994* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1996), 72-80. After

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highlighting the Horton episode, Professor Carter went on to describe the 1988 Bush tactics as benefiting from two decades of Democratic vulnerability. Concluding a discussion of the Edsalls's analysis, Carter wrote: "Yet race seemed to be the glue that held it all together. . . . Unwilling to make their case on the basis of pocketbook issues and well aware that such racial and social issues split the major elements of the old New Deal, Democrats stumbled along, offering few alternatives to the rising GOP challenge." The author added a telling item a few sentences later: "As one indiscreet GOP campaign official said gleefully in the 1988 campaign, every time Michael Dukakis appeared on a platform with Jesse Jackson, the Republican votes started coming up like change on a cash register" (p. 80).

<sup>35</sup> Germond and Witcover, *Whose Broad Stripes and Bright Stars?*, 409.

<sup>36</sup> Robin Toner, "Centrist Democrats Set Agenda for '92," *New York Times*, May 8, 1991. For more on the controversial Democratic Leadership Council, see Jon F. Hale's revealing article, "The Making of the New Democrats," *Political Science Quarterly*, CX (Summer 1995), 207-232.

<sup>37</sup> The quotation is contained in a four-page post-election supplement distributed by the publisher of the Edsalls's *Chain Reaction*.

<sup>38</sup> Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System*, 334-6.

<sup>39</sup> On this era, see George W. Knepper's chapter, "Progressivism and World War I," in his *Ohio and Its People*, 302-34. For an delightful account of Ohio Democratic politics during the first three decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, see James D. Robenalt, *Linking Rings: William W. Durbin and the Magic and Mystery of America* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2004).

<sup>40</sup> Knepper, *Ohio and Its People*, 361.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 430-31.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 381.

<sup>43</sup> For further details on the Gilligan interlude in Ohio politics, see McDiarmid's Chapter 6 in *Ohio Politics*.

<sup>44</sup> Of course, Ohio's Democratic index was held down in 1994 by the extraordinarily weak Democratic gubernatorial nominee that year opposing Governor George V. Voinovich's re-election. Robert L. Burch received only 25.0 percent of the vote to Voinovich's 71.8 percent.

<sup>45</sup> There has been much speculation about the effect of the large turnout increase in 2004. See Note 50 below for some hard data on the topic.

<sup>46</sup> Charles Becker, a Case undergraduate biomedical engineering major and a student in my fall 2004 course on the presidential election, kindly constructed this county-level map for me.

<sup>47</sup> Of this region, Bill Sloat of the Cleveland *Plain Dealer* wrote: "[E]conomic angst but not outright despair is haunting the worn, unglaciated hills huddled over the coal seams that fueled the industrial revolution. This is the portion of Ohio with rough edges and more than 4,000 abandoned coal mines." Sloat's article on Southeast Ohio appeared in a fact-filled 24-page special section the *Plain Dealer* published in the fall of 2004, entitled "The Five Ohios." The newspaper divided the state into five political regions and presented a wealth of useful information about each. Apart from Southeast Appalachia, the other four regions the *Plain Dealer* used to make up its "Five Ohios" were: the Northeast Industrial Heartland, Northwest Farm Belt, Central Exurbia, and Southwest Southland.

<sup>48</sup> The comments of James Ruvolo and Robert T. Bennett are from the video tape record of a panel, "Ohio's Role in Presidential Elections from FDR to 2004," organized and moderated by Alexander P. Lamis. The panel, one of four in a symposium on Ohio's role in presidential politics, was held October 5, 2004, at the Cleveland Museum of Art in conjunction with the

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“Race at Case,” a myriad of events at Case Western Reserve University on the day that the lone 2004 vice-presidential debate between Vice President Dick Cheney and Senator John Edwards of North Carolina, the Democratic vice-presidential nominee, took place on campus. Also participating on the panel were Prof. John C. Green of the University of Akron, Mike Curtin, president of the Columbus *Dispatch*, and Brent Larkin, editorial page director of the Cleveland *Plain Dealer*.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> James Dao, “Same-Sex Marriage Issue Key to Some G.O.P. Races,” *New York Times*, November 4, 2004. Actually, our calculations show that Bush improved on his 2000 showing at about the same percentage in each of the three groupings of the 69 Republican-leaning counties in Figure 4. In the 48 counties that voted Republican for president all five times from 1988 to 2004, Bush increased his vote in 2004 over his 2000 showing by an average of 21.4 percent. In the eight counties that voted Republican four out of five times, Bush’s percentage increase in 2004 was 19.9. And, in the 13 “swing” counties that voted Republican three out of five, the percentage was 20.6. Interestingly, Kerry improved on the 2000 Gore vote by even larger percentages in the 19 Democratic-leaning counties: 24.4 percent in the 11 counties that have gone Democratic five out of the last five presidential elections; 25.2 percent for the three counties that voted Democratic four of five times, and a whopping 34.2 percent for the five “swing” counties that went Democratic three out of five time. Of course, having Ralph Nader off of the Ohio ballot in 2004 helped Kerry. Still, Nader’s 2000 vote was only 2.5 percent in Ohio and no higher than 3.7 percent in any county except Athens, where the Green party nominee received 6.5 percent that year. Obviously, Republicans and Democrats “grew” their vote substantially in 2004. Further, Bush and Kerry improved at around the same percentage in

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the counties their parties do not carry regularly. In the 19 Democratic-leaning counties, Bush increased his vote as follows: 18.9 percent in the 11 strongest Democratic counties; 24.8 percent in the three counties that went Democratic four out of five times, and 19.9 percent in the “swing” Democratic counties. Likewise, Kerry improved on Gore’s vote by 23.3 percent in the 48 strongest Republican counties. In the eight counties that went Republican four of five times, Kerry increase the national Democratic vote by 22.9 percent, and in the 13 “swing” Republican counties, Kerry’s percentage increase was 21.1 percent. (Charles Becker, the Case student who constructed the map in Figure 4, also did these calculations for me.)

<sup>51</sup> Mark Naymik, Robert L. Smith, and Dave Davis, “How the president won Ohio, 2<sup>nd</sup> term,” *Plain Dealer*, November 4, 2004. The article quoted Harold Montgomery, a barbershop owner in Gallipolis, the Gallia county seat: “This is the Bible Belt. The election falls back to moral and social issues: gay rights, prayer in schools, the right to bear arms and abortion.”

<sup>52</sup> The tables were constructed by Renée M. Lamis, to whom the author is most grateful.

<sup>53</sup> This is not surprising since a new realignment does not completely wipe away all of the cleavages of the past. See Sundquist’s “overlay” analogy discussion, which is quoted at length in Note 19 above.

<sup>54</sup> Ruvolo’s comments were made in an April 17, 2005, e-mail message to the author in response to an inquiry.

<sup>55</sup> For a recent discussion of the technique, see W. Phillips Shively, *The Craft of Political Research*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2005), 110-130. Also, see Alexander P. Lamis, “An Explanation of the Correlation Technique,” in *The Two-Party South*, 327-330. A delightful, older account appears in V. O. Key, Jr., *A Primer of Statistics for Political Scientists* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954), 105-129. In one section,

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Key asks, “Why correlate?” His answer: “The process of correlation constitutes one of the most valuable tools for the analysis of political data.” Ibid., 124. Professor Key offers researchers a further piece of advice: “A question of practical tactics in correlational analysis is how to present the findings. To most audiences to which one directs his findings, the coefficient of . . . correlation is a symbol devoid of content. . . . By the exercise of a modicum of ingenuity, the most hardened audience of skeptics about statistics may be seduced into following the findings of a correlation analysis.” Then, he added a final cautionary note, one that I didn’t follow, perhaps at my peril: “In the process it is often just as well to avoid employing the term correlation.” Ibid., 125-126.

<sup>56</sup> The “best-fit” or “least-squares” line sums up “the single line that best approximates” the patterns of the diamond-markers if a perpendicular line were drawn up or down from each diamond on the scattergram, or, to put it in slightly more technical language, the line minimizes “the squared differences between each of the observed points.” Shively, *Craft of Political Research*, 114.

<sup>57</sup> For a thorough exploration of the national forces at play in what she terms the “culture-wars realignment,” see Renée M. Lamis, *The Realignment of Pennsylvania Politics Since 1960* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, forthcoming January 2009). In Chapters 1 and 2, she fully analyzes the relationship of the recent national changes to the electoral patterns in the Keystone State.

<sup>58</sup> Geoffrey Kunkler of Wooster and David Gasser of Toledo, undergraduate political science majors at Case Western Reserve University, assisted with this section on the 2006 elections by providing me with various newspaper articles written during the campaign. I very much appreciate their help.

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<sup>59</sup> Dann resigned as attorney general in mid-May 2008. The *Columbus Dispatch* reported that Dann “had been under pressure to resign since a May 2 report by two of his office’s attorneys found widespread mismanagement, cronyism and tolerance for sexual harassment in his office.” James Nash and Alan Johnson, “Dann Resigns,” *Columbus Dispatch*, May 14, 2008. Governor Strickland played a prominent role in getting Dann to quit.

<sup>60</sup> Because Sykes, an African American, was the only statewide Democrat running for a nonjudicial post in 2006 to lose, “suspicion lingers among some black leaders,” three *Columbus Dispatch* reporters wrote in a post-election analysis article, “that race was instrumental in the defeat of Sykes . . . .” The article pointed out the following: “Taylor’s campaign conducted so-called ‘push poll’ phone calls to voters informing them that, among other things, Sykes was president of the Ohio Legislative Black Caucus. Sykes filed a federal lawsuit accusing Taylor of racial discrimination; Taylor agreed to cease and Sykes dropped the lawsuit.” State Representative Joyce Beatty of Columbus, the Democratic leader of the Ohio House, commented: “I am very concerned, as an African-American and as a leader, that we have not done a good job of electing African-Americans [statewide].” Sherri Williams, Joe Hallett, and Mark Niquette, “Lack of Support: Blackwell Won Few of the White Conservative or Black Votes He Thought He Could Expect,” *Columbus Dispatch*, November 19, 2006.

<sup>61</sup> For example, at one debate, drawing on a standard line in his stump speech, Strickland charged: “We have had 16 years of this current administration Mr. Blackwell has been a part of. And what are the results—the results are incompetence, corruption, and in some cases, illegal behavior.” Mark Naymik, “Blackwell, Strickland Both Claim They Can Fix a Broken Ohio,” *Plain Dealer*, October 22, 2006.

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<sup>62</sup> Mark Naymik, “Strickland, Blackwell Use Debate To Toss Labels,” *Plain Dealer*, September 6, 2006; Associated Press dispatch, “G.O.P. Fund-Raiser Sentenced for Embezzlement in Ohio,” *New York Times*, November 21, 2006, and William Hershey, “Strickland Becomes First Dem Governor Since ’91,” *Dayton Daily News*, November 8, 2006.

<sup>63</sup> Peter Slevin, “Ohio May Hold Key Lessons for 2008: Strategists Studying Democrats’ Success in State Crucial to GOP,” *Washington Post*, November 11, 2006. See also Felix Hoover and Dennis M. Mahoney, “Faithful Voted on Values: War, Scandals and Social Justice All Swayed Religious Voters, Observers Say,” *Columbus Dispatch*, November 10, 2006, and Julie Carr Smyth, “‘God, Guns, Gays’ a Stretch for Average Voters,” Associated Press dispatch from Columbus, July 26, 2006.

<sup>64</sup> Reginald Fields, “‘Republicans for Strickland’ Speak Out,” *Plain Dealer*, September 13, 2006.

<sup>65</sup> Naymik, “Strickland, Blackwell Use Debate To Toss Labels.” Incidentally, Strickland’s running mate for lieutenant governor was Lee Fisher of Cleveland, the former Ohio attorney general and the Democratic party’s unsuccessful gubernatorial nominee in 1998.

<sup>66</sup> David Brooks, “2008: The Prequel,” *New York Times*, October 12, 2006.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid. Incidentally, Brooks concluded his informative column by suggesting that Ohio and Ohio issues may again be “the Heart of It All” in the 2008 presidential election, writing: “Ohio is crucial to winning the presidency. If Brown wins this year, he’ll be the model for Democrats nationally. If DeWine pulls this out, Republicans will copy him. This is what politics looks like as conservatism wanes: feisty economic liberals against independent, party-bucking Republicans.”

<sup>68</sup> Renée Lamis kindly constructed the 2006 exit-poll tables for me.

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<sup>69</sup> Williams, Hallett, and Niquette, “Lack of Support.”

<sup>70</sup> Mark Naymik, “Strickland Courted Rural Ohio; It Paid Off,” *Plain Dealer*, November 9, 2006.

<sup>71</sup> Since there was an election for both governor and U.S. senator in 2006, the party-strength figure this year is a final one because no percentage in the formula will change after the next election. In years when there is no race either for governor or for U.S. senator, the latest party-strength figure is considered preliminary until the next election can be used to find an average to “fill in” the missing percentage or percentages, a process Professor David called interpolation, as already mentioned. For more on the construction of the David index, see Notes 2 and 3 above.

<sup>72</sup> For full details on the Big Ten Battleground Poll, consult its highly informative web site at: <http://www.bigtenpoll.org/about.html>.

<sup>73</sup> See Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System*, 191-197. This section of his Chapter 9, “Minor Realignments of the 1920s,” is entitled: “The ‘Al Smith Revolution’ in the East.”

<sup>74</sup> Robert Dallek, *An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy 1917-1963* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2003), 284.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 644.

<sup>76</sup> Gary A. Donaldson, *The First Modern Campaign: Kennedy, Nixon, and the Election of 1960* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 157.