RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN THE
			     TRADITIONAL TIBETAN STATE(1)
				MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN
			   CASE, WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY


   Introduction
   
      Ruled by an incarnation, the Dalai Lama, and supporting a monastic seg-
   ment comprising between ten and twenty percent of the eligible males, Tibet
   was a state in which religious interests and priorities predominated.  "Reli-
   gion' (and the religious segment), however, was not the homogeneous entity
   it is typically implied to be, even within the Gelugpa Sect, and the great
   Gelugpa monasteries were often at odds with the Dalai Lama's government.
   In this paper I shall examine aspects of this discord and then present several
   illustrations of such conflict from twentieth century Tibetan history.
      Monasticism is fundamental to both Mahayana and Theravada Buddhism
   and is found wherever Buddhism exists.  However, the Tibetan form of
   monasticism differed from other forms in terms of a variety of fundamental
   factors such as: 1) its mass philosophy and accompanying size; 2) its theory
   of recruitment; and 3) its internal organization and normative structure.
      The Tibetan monastic system supported a staggering number of monks.
   Surveys show that there were 97,528 monks in Central Tibet and Khams in
   1694, and 319,270 monks in 1733 (Dung-dkar 1981: 109).  Assuming that
   the population of these areas was about 2.5 million in 1733, monks thus con-
   stituted about thirteen percent of the total population and about twenty-six
   percent of the males.  The magnitude of this can be appreciated by com-
   paring it to Thailand, another prominent Buddhist society, where monks
   comprised only one to two percent of the total number of males (Tambiah
   1976: 266-267).  A critical factor underlying this size was the Tibetan belief
   that the state should foster the spiritual (religious) development of the couil-
   try by making monkhood available to the largest number of persons.  The
   scope of monasticism (and the cycle of religious rituals and ceremonies the
   monks performed) was seen in turn as the measure of the Tibetan state's
   success.  Monasticism in Tibet, therefore, was not the otherworldly domain
   of a minute elite; rather it was a mass phenomenon.
     The Tibetan monastic system was also striking in that, first, the over-
   whelming majority of monks were placed in monasteries by their parents
   when they were between the ages of seven and ten, without particular re-
   gard to their predispositions or wishes; and second, becoming a monk was
   not a temporary undertaking but rather a lifelong commitment.
     There were many reasons why parents made their son a monk.  For some,
   it was their deep religious belief that being a monk was a great privilege
   and honor.  For others, it was a culturally valued way to reduce the number
   of mouths to feed, while also ensuring that their son would never have to
   experience the hardships of village life.  Again, sometimes parents made a
   son a monk to fulfill a solemn promise made to a deity when the son was
   very ill.  Yet, in other cases, recruitment was simply the result of a corvee
   tax obligation to a monastery which was their lord.
     Parents sometimes broached the subject with their sons, but usually they
   simply told the child of their decision.  The monastery officially asked the
   young boys whether they wanted to be monks.  But this was really pro forma,
   and if, for example, a newly made child monk ran away from the monastery,
   this would not result in his dismissal on the grounds that he did not want to
   be a monk.  A number of monks recalled that they had fled to their homes
   after a few months' initial stay in the monastery only to receive a beating
   from their fathers who immediately took them back.  The monks relating
   these incidents did not see this as abusive.  Rather, they laughed at how
   stupid they were at the time to want to give up the opportunity of being a
   monk.  Tibetans, lay and monk alike, generally feel that young boys cannot
   comprehend the wonder and importance of being a monk, and that it is up
   to their elders to see to it that they have the right opportunities.  Thus, the
   decision to make a child a monk was predominantly the prerogative of the
   parental generation rather than derived from either the wishes of the child
   or some perception of a deep-seated predilection in the child for the monk's
   life.
     Once accepted, it was hoped that the novice would remain a monk for
   his entire life, adhering, minimally, to a vow of celibacy.  However, monks
   clearly had the right to leave the monastic community whenever they wanted.
   Given the almost random selection of novice monks, powerful mechanisms
   were needed to retain young monks who had to face a life of celibacy.  The
   monastic system, in fact, possessed effective mechanisms for facilitating this7
   including economic security, comradeship, and a very liberal (or lax) view
   of monastic activities and discipline.  For example, the Tibetan monastic
   system did not attempt to weed out novices who seemed unsuited for a
   rigorous life of prayer, study and meditation, and monks were expelled only
   for the most serious crimes of murder and heterosexual intercourse.  Similarly,
   there were no exams which novices or monks had to pass in order to remain
   in the monastery (although there were exams for higher statuses within the
   monks' ranks).  Monks who had no interest in studying or meditating were
   as welcome as the virtuoso scholar monks.
      On the other hand, monks leaving the monastery faced significant eco-
   nomic problems.  Because they lost whatever rights they might otherwise
   have had in their family farm (patrimony) when they entered the monastery,
   departing monks had to face the task of finding a source of income.  Com-
   plicating this was the fact that they reverted to their original serf status
   when they departed, and were thus liable for service to their lord.  These and
   other factors made it both easy and advantageous for monks to remain in
   the monastery.
      The elevated status of monks and monasteries was manifest also in their
   treatment as semi-autonomous units within the Tibetan state 7,-th the ex-
   clusive right to judge and discipline their own monks in all cases except
   murder and treason.
      This relative autonomy, however, did not mean that the monastic system
   was disinterested in the political affairs of the country.  It wag actually very
   concerned.  The reason for this derives from the fundamental ideology of
   the Tibetan state and its economic and political ramifications.  Tibetans
   considered their country unique by virtue of its support and patronage of
   religion as its primary goal.  This was nicely phrased in a letter the Tibetan
   Foreign Bureau sent Chiang Kai-shek in 1946:
        There are many great nations on this earth who have achieved
        unprecedented wealth and might, but there is only one nation
        which is dedicated to the well-being of humanity in the world
        and that is the religious land of Tibet which cherishes a joint
        spiritual and temporal system....(2)
      However, this 'joint spiritual and temporal system" ideology did not pre-
   clude serious conflict between the monasteries and the government with re-
   gard8 to specific actions and options, for there was no unanimity on who was
   best able to determine what was in the best interests of religion and thus
   Tibet.  The monks believed that the political and economic system existed
   to further their ends, and that they, not the government, were the best judge
   of what was in the short and long term interests of religion.  They could not
   accept that decisions detrimental to their monasteries could benefit Tibet's
   unique religious system, and they believed it was the monasteries' religious
   duty and right to intervene whenever they felt the government was acting
   against the interests of religion, which they generally saw as their own college
   or monastery.  This, of course, brought them into the mainstream of political
   affairs and into potential conflict with the Dalai Lama and the government
   who also felt they were acting in the best interest of Tibet and religion.  Al-
   though the great monasteries did not involve themselves in the day-to-day
   operation of government administration, they played an important role in
   larger issues.  For example, in the 1920s, a bitter dispute emerged over the
   Thirteenth Dalai Lama's plan to enlarge the army.  The Dalai Lama saw this
   as necessary to preserve Tibet's integrity vis-a-vis China, while the monks
   saw it as a threat to their superiority with regard to both coercive force and
   the institutionalization of alien British values.
     One major theme of modem Tibetan history, then, was the conflict be-
  tween the desire of the government to control the monastic segment, par-
  ticularly the three great Gelugpa monasteries in and around Lhasa: Sera,
  Drepung and Ganden.
  The Three Monastic Seats
     Sera, Drepung and Ganden were collectively known as the "Three Seats"
  (gdan-sa gsum) of the Gelugpa Sect, because they acted as the main monas-
  teries for hundreds of smaller branch monasteries.  These three monasteries
  were enormous, resembling bustling towns as much as sanctuaries for the
  pursuit of other-worldly studies.  Their monks were basically divided into
  two groups: those who were pursuing higher studies, the 'readers," and
  those who were not.  The former became the scholars while the latter typ-
  ically could only read and chant their prayer books.(3) In the Mey College
  of Sera Monastery, for example, only about 800 of the 2800 (twenty-nine                    
  percent) were "readers."(4) Of these 800, a large proportion never went be
  yond the lower levels of learning.  The nonreaders worked for the monastery
  (or themselves), or simply lived off the daily distributions and teas provided
  by the monastery during the collective prayer sessions.  However, although
  so many of the monks were engaged in non-scholarly and non-meditative
  pursuits, all were (heterosexually) celibate.
     Drcpung, the largest of the three monasteries, officially held 7700 monks,
  but actually contained about 10,000 in 1951.  Sera officially held 5500 and
  Ganden 3300, but they actually housed about 7000 and 5000 monks respec-
  tively.  By contrast, the army normally present in Lhasa numbered only 1000--
  1500 troops.  Moreover, as many as ten to fifteen percent of the monks housed
  in the Three Seats were dobdos (ldab-ldob) or "fighting monks." These
  monks had a distinctive appearance (e.g., hair style and the manner of tying
  their robes), and they belonged to clubs which held regular athletic compe-
  titions.  They also typically engaged in ritualized armed combat according to
  a code of chivalry, and often acted as bodyguards for the monastery.(5) The
  presence of 20,000 monks in and around Lhasa, thousands of whom were
  "this-worldly," aggressive, fighting monks traditionally afforded the Three
  Seats tremendous coercive leverage vis-'a-vis the government, whose army
  they dwarfed before 1920.
     The Three Seats somewhat resembled the classic British universities such
  as Oxford in that the overall entity, the monastery, was in reality a combi-
  nation of semi-autonomous sub-units, known in Tibetan as tratsang (grwa-
  tshang).  By analogy with British universities, these are commonly called
  "colleges" in English.  Monks belonged to a monastery only through their
  membership in a college, and although there was a standing committee that
  functioned with regard to monastery-wide issues, there was no abbot for the
  whole monastery, only for individual colleges.
     Each tratsang had its own administration and resources, and in turn was
   comprised of important residential sub-units known as khamtsen (khams-
   tshan) which contained the actual domiciles (apartments or cells) of their
   monks.  Like the college, they had their own administration and, to a degree,
   their own resources.
     A potential monk could enter any of the Three Seats but within the
   monastery had to enroll in a specific khamtsen depending on the region
   he was from.  Membership in a khamtsen, therefore, was automatic and mu-
   tually exclusive.  For example, a monk from Kham (Eastern Tibet), or more
   likely, from one of a number of regions in Kham, had to enter one and only
   one khamtsen.(6) Thus, khamtsen exhibited considerable internal linguistic
   and cultural homogeneity.  Since different khamtsen were affiliated with dif-
   ferent colleges, the college level also often had a regional flavor.  Colleges and
   their khamtsen units occupied a specific spatial area within the monastery,
   and were the center of ritual, educational, social and political activities for
   their members.
     Each of these units - the monastery, the various colleges and the khamt-
   sen - were corporate entities.  They had an identity and a name which
   continued across generations, owned property and wealth in the name of the
   entity, and had internal organization.  While the monks came and went, the
   entity and its property continued.  Moreover, it is essential to note that a
   monk's loyalties were primarily rooted at the khamtsen and college levels,
   and there was often little feeling of brotherhood between monks of different
   colleges despite their being from the same monastery.
     Thus, there were competing units within the Three Seats.  The monastic
   colleges were often at odds with each other, and even the incarnate lamas
   were allied with specific monastic colleges and khamtsen.  An essential flaw
   in the Tibetan politico-religious system was, therefore, that while religious
   priority was universally accepted, defining what benefited religion or religious
   entities was often contested.
     Religion, though in one sense a homogeneous force in Tibetan politics,
   was also a fragmenting and conflicting force.  Competition between the vari-
   ous religious entities to increase their influence and prestige and the lack of
   consensus regarding which policies were in the interests of religion plagued
   modern Tibetan history during the twentieth century.  An interesting exam-
   ple of such intra-religious conflict took place in 1921 between the Tibetan
   government and the Loseling College of Drepung Monastery.
   The Tshaja Incident
     The relations between the Dalai Lama and the Loseling College of Dre-
   pung Monastery had been strained for years.  The Tengyeling (Demo) Con-
   spiracy and, more importantly, the support Loseling gave to the Chinese
   during 1911-1912 when the Dalai Lama's volunteer army was trying to drive
   the Chinese out of LliRsa, had infuriated the Dalai Lama.  Led by Losel-
   ing College's three chantso (phyag-mdzod; business managers), the Tshaja,
   Phuja and Gongja,(7) Drepung Monastery had adhered to a pro-Chinese and
   anti-Dalai Lama policy.(8) When the Dalai Lama's officials ordered them to
   send monks to help fight against the Chinese, they refused, saying that they
   were monks, not soldiers.  They agreed to fight only if the Chinese tried to
   force their way into Drepung itself, not otherwise.  Many of the Loseling
   officials such as the Tshaja were from Chinese-administered parts of Kham
   and tended to have pro-Chinese leanings.  This orientation was well known
   to the Manchu Amban who fled to Drepung when he feared for his life and
   was sheltered by the monastic officials in a mountaintop retreat until the
   fighting was over (Surkhang, interview).
      Loseling's behavior warranted punishment, but during the period 1913-
   1919, the Dalai Lama was too preoccupied with the Simla talks and the
   warfare in Kham to confront Loseling and teach it the lesson he felt it needed.
   But by late 1920, there were no such restraints, and when a dispute arose in
   Loseling College, he took the opportunity to attack its leaders.
      The incident began in late 1920, when the Loseling chantso led by the
   Tshaja told a former monastic official named Adala that his khamtsen (Tsha
   Khamtsen) wanted him to give back an estate he was using.(9) Adala had
   been holding this estate on "permanent lease" (kha-'dzin), paying Loseling
   a lease-fee every year, and managing the estate as if it were his own.  Feeling
   he had permanent rights to this estate so long as he paid the annual fee, he
   refused to return it.  When the Loseling managers decided to take it by force,
   Adala complained to an acquaintance, the powerful Dronyerchenmo.  He
   immediately saw this as an opportunity to get bark at the Loseling managers,
   and he told Adala to petition the government.(10)
      With this petition in hand, the Dronyerchenmo summoned the three
   Loseling managers to a meeting and arrested them.  The very next day they
   were sentenced and punished.  Although judicial orders normally specified
   the nature of the crime or misdeed, in this case the order simply said that,
   "your faults are known to you so there is no need to list them." The Tshaja
   and Phuja were whipped, their private property confiscated and finally they
   were exiled (Surkhang, interview; Shan-kha-ba n.d.).
      When the monks in Drepung found about these acts, Loseling held
   a meeting to discuss what to do.  Led by two monks named Anjanali and
   Ngogar, the monks decided to go en masse to the Norbulingka Palace to
   present their case to the Dalai Lama, i.e., to demand the release of the two
   managers.
      The monks of nearby Nechung Monastery tried to persuade the Loseling
   monks not to go to Lhasa when they saw them pouring out of Drepung,
   but several thousand Loseling monks went on to Norbulingka, forcing their
   monastery officials to accompany them.  The guards at the Norbulingka
   Palace gate also could not stop them and they pushed their way into the
   palace grounds right to the "Yellow Wall" which surrounds the living area of
   the Dalai Lama.  There the senior monastic officials prostrated and shouted
   that they wanted to see the Dalai Lama, who was in retreat at the time.  They
   yelled that their managers had done no wrong and so should be released and
   their property returned.  The monks also taunted the troops on guard by the
   Yellow Wall, daring them to shoot.  When they did not, the mob of monks
   forcibly took away the troops' arms and broke them.  While the senior monks
   shouted and prostrated, the younger monks urinated and defecated all over
   the Dalai Lama's gardens, pulled up and trampled the flowers, broke statues
   and sang especially loudly in order to disturb the Dalai Lama.(11)
      The Lonchen Sholkhang came out to try to calm them.  He made the tradi-
   tional thumbs-up pleading gesture and said, "Please don't do this.  Whatever
   you have to say, tell me." But the monks treated him rudely and with dis-
   dain, saying, 'Old man, you don't know anything.  We want to see the Dalai
   Lama" (Urgyenla, interview; Surkhang, interview; Bell 1946).
      Tsarong, the army's commander-in-chief, was immediately summoned to
   Norbulingka Palace, but many advisors feared that calling out the military
   and opening fire on the monks could push the other colleges and monaster-
   ies to support Loseling and possibly precipitate an all-out civil war.  The
   government's military position in Lhasa at this time consisted of only about
   700 troops, not an adequate force to control a joint reaction by the Three
   Seats, so it was ultimately decided that the most prudent course was that no
   action be taken to eject the monks forcibly.  The Dalai Lama pretended he
   knew nothing of what had happened, and by the afternoon the monks tired
   of the protest and left Norbtilingka.  In the meantime, the Dalai Lama and
   Tsarong issued orders to recall several thousand troops and Militia to Lhasa
   preparation for a possible confrontation with Loseling.  Live ammunition
   was also issued to the troops in Lhasa at this time.(12)
      That niglit soldiers were stationed in front of Drepung where they set up
   camps, and the Dalai Lama, through Tsarong, ordered Loseling to turn over
   the ringleaders of the protest.  The monks, as expected, refused.  Loseling
   College appealed to the monks of Sera and Ganden, as well as to the monks
   of Drepung's other major college (Gomang) to support them, and then they
   posted pickets above their monastery.(13) Various lamas, such as Kundeling
   and Ditru, tried to mediate the confrontation, but the monks would not
   agree to turn over their ringleaders.  Sera, however, quickly refused to join
   Loseling; later Ganden also refused, as did Drepung's own Gomang College.
   Loseling was on its own.  But since it contained 4000-5000 monks, it was
   still a formidable opponent.  The monks threatened to attack Norbulingka
   and Lhasa, and said that they would seize the Dronyerchenmo, whom they
   saw as their main enemy in this fight (Bell 1946: 327).
     By the second week in August, the Tibetan government had massed sev-
   eral thousand troops in Lhasa and felt confident that they could handle the
   monks.  Loseling College was to be taught a lesson, though without bloodshed
   if possible.  With the reinforced government troops deployed in a semicircle
   in front of the monastery (with strict orders from the Dalai Lama not to
   fire upon it), new demands were made to the monks to turn over the lead-
   ers of the demonstration (Bell 1946: loc. cit.). Loseling now found itself in
   an untenable situation.  It was without support from other monasteries; it
   had been unable to get the Eastern Tibetan (Khamba) community in Lhasa
   to lend military support; and it was blocked by a large army force led by
   Tsarong, an official who was likely to have no qualms in taking on the monks
   militarily.  Loseling, therefore, backed down.  By mid-September, it had sur-
   rendered eleven ringleaders of the protest,(14) and others who had run away,
   such as Anjanali, were captured in caves on the mountains behind Drepung
   after an all-out search, during which the government ordered all district offi-
   cials to seize and hold any Loseling monks who passed their way (Urgyenla,
   interview).  The government even interrupted a teaching of Taktra Rinpoche
   in his hermitage north of Lhasa to see if Anjanali might be there (Khri-byang
   1978: 94-95).
      All told, about sixty monks were arrested, paraded around the city, lightly
   flogged, shackled and had cangues placed on their necks.  They were then
   put into the custody of various aristocratic families.  The Dalai Lama dis-
   missed a the Drepung abbots, and passed a rule giving himself the right, for
   the first time, to appoint the managers of Drepung's khamtsen.  He also im-
   posed a new rule whereby these managers were chosen only from monks who
   hailed from nearby, i.e., Central Tibetan, places.  This was done to decrease
   the power of the Khamba monks whom the Dalai Lama saw as more pro-
   Chinese and less amenable to control by the central government (Urgyenla,
   interview).
      For the first time in modern Tibetan history, the government's army had
   confronted the monks directly and forced them to concede, although not a
   single shot was fired.  The Loseling incident of 1921 served notice that the
   monks of the Three Seats could no longer intimidate the Dalai Lama with
   impunity.  The Dalai Lama later told Bell that, "it was necessary for me to
   make a show of force or else the large monasteries would continually give me
   trouble"; but he went on to say that he intended to show them leniency.(15)
   And in a sense he did.  While the ringleaders were severely punished, the
   monastery and the monks were not.  No estates were confiscated, as had
   been the case with Tengyeling.(16)
   The Flight of the Panchen Lama
      The need to build a strong military and maintain a large army equipped
  with modern British rifles on the Kham border had dramatically increased
  the expenses of the Tibetan Government and resulted in the imposition of a
  special tax on the great monasteries, including Tashilhunpo, the seat of the
  Panchen Lama.  Outside of the central government, the Panchen Lama was
  the largest estate-holder, possessing not only numerous manorial estates, but
  also ten whole districts.
     There was considerable ill feeling between the officials of the Dalai Lama
  and the Panchen Lama due to the Panchen Lama's behavior following the
  Dalai Lama's flights to exile in 1904 and 1910.  When the question of financial
  support for the large contingent of troops on active duty arose, some remem-
  bered that during a previous war with Nepal in 1791 (when the Gurkha
  troops attacked Tashilhunpo), the Panchen Lama had paid one-quarter of
  all the military costs.  The Dalai Lama used this as a precedent, and, after
  returning to Tibet in 1912, he informed the Panchen Lama that he had to
  pay one-fourth of the total military costs of the 1912-1913 Chinese war, as
  well as one-fourth of the costs of the Tibeto-British wars of 1888 and 1904.
  This amounted to 27,000 ke (khal) of grain.  Tashilhunpo vigorously disagreed
  with this interpretation and did not pay the entire amount (Don-khang 1984:
  2).
     The relations between the Dalai and Panchen Lamas deteriorated further
  in 1917, when the Dalai Lama instituted a new rule called the Fire-Snake-
  Year Order (me-sbrul bka'-rtsa) which made the serfs of Tashilhunpo in
  Gyantse District pay one-seventh of the horse and carrying-animal corvee
  tax on levies of over one hundred horses and three hundred carrying animals.
  Since Tashilhunpo had written statements from past Dalai Lamas exempting
  its serfs from providing such corvee services for anyone but Tashilhunpo,
  the Panchen Lama viewed this as an illegal abrogation of his prerogatives.
  Similarly, in 1923, the Water-Pig-Year Order (chu-phag bka'-rtsa) extended
  this to all Tashilhunpo serfs in Tsang (Don-khang 1984: 35).  In 1922, the
  new government "Revenue Investigation Office' had also levied an additional
  annual tax of about 30,000 ke of grain and 10,000 silver coins on Tashilhunpo
  (ibid.: 57).
     The Panchen Lama and his officials attacked the validity of the new taxes,
  arguing that the precedent on which they were based was invalid.  They ar-
  gued that they had only paid one-fourth of the Tibetan government's mil-
  itary expenses in 1791 because their own city and monastery were under
  attack.  They also argued that they could not afford to make such pay-
  ments and still fulfill their religious obligations to their monks, and they
  presented documents which granted them tax exemptions.  Meanwhile, each
  year they protested the decision, the unpaid taxes piled up.  Lungshar, a
  Tsipon, played a major role in this controversy, insisting that the Pancchen
  Lama could pay the new tax.  His examination of the Panchen Lama's gov-
  ernment records documented that they could easily pay the new levy and do
  the corvee taxes.  He convinced the Dalai Lama that the real motive behind
  the Panchen Lama's reftisal was his ambivalence over the supreme authority
  of the Dalai Lama.  Thus, increasing revenue to support the army produced
  a major dispute between the Panchen Lama and the central government.
     Additional details of this dispute come from the Panchen Lama's approach
  to the British in India (through MacDonald, the Gyantse Trade Agent) ask-
  ing for their help.  MacDonald reported in a letter to his superiors in the
  Indian Government:
           I have the honour to report that His Serenity the Tashi [Panchen]
           Lama sent a messenger to me yesterday with a private letter
           (which he requested me to return to him) stating as follows:
              ... That the Lhasa Government has demanded that the Tashi
           Lhunpo Government should contribute one fourth of the total
           expenditure for the upkeep of the Tibetan Army, which consists
           of the following:
              (a) Rs. 650,000/- approximately,
              (b) 10,000 mounds of grain valued at Rs. 80,000/-,
              (c) 2,000 boxes of Chinese brick-tea, valued at Rs. 85,000/-.
              (d) In addition to the above, they have asked for other liberal
           concessions (not mentioned in the above letter).
              ... In default of complying with the above demands, I have
           been informed that the officials of the Tashi Lhunpo Government
           who are undergoing imprisonment at the Potala Palace will not
           be released and others will also be imprisoned.
              ... His Serenity the Tashi Lama states that he is unable to
           meet the demands made upon him and he proposes to submit
           a representation to His Holiness the Dalai Lama on the subject.
           If his request is granted, things will then of course be all right;
           but if not, His Serenity wishes to know whether the Government
           of India will mediate between himself and His Holiness the Dalai
           Lama as he states that his only hope is the assistance of the
           Government of India.1r
     The Panchen Lama, after several unsuccessful protests by his officials
  and one abortive attempt to escape when he went to the hot springs of
  Lhatse District (Phun-rab 1984: 130), secretly fled to Mongolia and China on
  December 26, 1923, leaving the following set of instructions for his followers
  in Tashilhunpo:
           Be it known to all the Abbots and Assistants of the four colleges
           and also to the Acting Prime Minister and the Monk and Lay
           officials of the Tashi Lhunpo Government:-
              With regard to the troubles of the Tashi-Lhunpo Government
           and their subjects, I have submitted representations to His Holi-
           nem the Dalai Lama on several occasions, but my requests have
           not been granted. At the same time His Holiness has always               I
           shown me kindness.  The investigating officers listened to the
           advice of evil-minded persons and made it very difficult for His
           Holiness to grant my requests.  In consequence, orders were issued
           to all Jongpoens of the Tsang Province that they must supply free
           transport, etc., to the officials of the Lhasa Government, against
           the prevailing custom.  Moreover, I have been asked to make con-
           tributions for the upkeep of the Tibetan Army, but the nobles
           and subjects were unable to take the responsibility of meeting
           these demands.  For these reasons, the subjects of the Tashi-
           Lhunpo Government were disappointed and became dissatisfied.
           You are all aware of these facts and these things have made it
           quite impossible for us to live in peace.  I should have made fur-
           ther representation, but it would have created a difficult position
           for His Holiness.  I am therefore leaving Tashi-Lhunpo for a short
           period to make it easier for His Holiness the Dalai Lama.  I am
           going to see whether I can secure anyone to mediate between
           us, with the assistance of the dispensers of gifts in Kham and
           Mongolia whither I have despatched messengers.  It is quite im-
           possible for me to make the annual contributions to meet the
           Military expenses and I am compelled to proceed to an unknown
           destination to try to raise funds from the Buddhists who may be
           inclined to help me voluntarily.  I may state here once and for
           all that I have no desire to do anything against the wishes of His
           Holiness the Dalai Lama or that will be injurious to our pres-
           tige.  The letter which I have addressed to His Holiness should
           be at once forwarded, so as to make matters clear to him.  After
           due consideration I have appointed the Acting Prime Minister [of
           Tashilhunpo] and the Abbots of the four Colleges [of Tashilhunpo]
           to carry on the administration during my absence.  First of all,
           you should see that the customary ceremonies are performed in
           the Tashi-Lhunpo and other monasteries as usual.  You should
           also see that the Lamas of the different monasteries receive their
           rations; and that the monks study all the religious books and
           preach the religion, and that they do not neglect the subject of
           disputation; and above all, you should see that all the monas-
           tic rules arc duly observed.  Finally, you should discharge your
           duties faithfully and treat the poor subjects and monks with all
           consideration and help them in every way possible.  You should
           keep careful accounts of all receipts and expenditure from land
           revenue, etc., and apply the balance for the observance of reli-
           gious ceremonies.  You should carry on your duties appertaining
           to the spiritual and temporal powers after due consultation; but
           if you cannot decide any big question, you should refer the mat-
           ter to me for orders.  You should discharge the duties of your
           responsible position without fail and leave nothing undone.  I
           hereby command all the monks and laymen, who are subjects of
           the Tashi-Lhunpo Government, to obey the orders of the Acting
           Prime Minister and Council and discharge their duties faithfully.
           Let all noblemen and peasants bear these instructions in mind
           and act accordingly.  I will issue necessary orders in the future
           according to circumstances.  Let all the animate beings bear this
           in mind.  I have issued these orders on the auspicious date -
           the 18th day of the 11th month of the Water-Pig Year (26th
           December, 1923).(18)
     The Tibetan government sent troops to seize the Panchen Lama, but they
  were too late and he escaped together with a large entourage.  The Dalai
  Lama responded by appointing his own officials to take over the adminis-
  tration of Tashilhunpo.  The Panchen Lama, despite subsequent attempts
  at rapprochement, lived out the rest of his life in exile in China, dying in
  Jyekundo in 1937.
  The Toba Abbot Incident
     A third well known incident occurred when Reting, the Regent, attempted
  to force the retirement of the abbot of Mey College of his own Sera Monastery
  so that he could appoint one of his own supporters.
     Reting's staunch supporter during his period of power consolidation in
  the late 1930s was the abbot of Toba College in Sera.  Although this college
  carried the title of "abbot,' it was in reality one of the anachronistic colleges
  that no longer had any monks or property.  The abbacy of this college,
  however, was usually seen as a stepping stone in the monastic hierarchy, as
  it was common for the Toba abbot to be made the abbot of one of the real
  colleges when an opening occurred.  Reting, however, wanted to award his
  ally, the Toba Abbot, immediately, so he decided to force the current abbot
  of Sera Mey College to resign and then appoint the Toba Abbot in his place.
     The incumbent abbot of Mey College was a learned and pious elderly
  monk, admired and respected by all the monks.  He was also a Khamba, and
  very close to the Pandatsang family, both of whom came from Markham.
  Pandatsang, in turn, was a close supporter of Reting.  Consequently, Reting
  asked Pandatsang to convey to the abbot that he wanted him to resign from
  his position at once.  Reting tried to sweeten the blow by offering the old
  abbot the title and rights of an ex-abbot (thereby making him eligible to
  attend the government and monastic assemblies) and giving him the yield
  from the estate assigned as salary to the Mey Abbot for one more year.(19)
  The old abbot did not wish to disobey the Regent and immediately agreed
  to resign.  However, he knew that the monks of Sera Mey were not partic-
  ularly fond of Reting, who was from their rival college (Sera Che), and he
  suspected that they would insist on his remaining abbot if he announced his
  intentions to resign.  He requested, therefore, to be allowed to resign without
  informing the monks.  Reting agreed to this and the abbot submitted his
  written resignation.
     The Sera Mey monks were first surprised and then incensed, as they grad-
  ually discovered what had transpired.  Consequently, when the order came
  from the government to submit a list of candidates for the abbacy, the monks
  guessed (or were secretly told) that the reason behind the resignation was
  to allow Reting to appoint the Toba Abbot.  They decided first to follow
  traditional rules and submitted to the government (Regent) a list of five
  unusually outstanding candidates, but they did not include the Toba Ab-
  bot among them.  They also agreed internally to stage a mass walk-out if
  the Toba Abbot were appointed.  Usually only a ranked list of names was
  submitted, but the Mey College monks were so angered that they added a
  written note:
           The elimination of our good abbot has made us very sad, but
           this is finished.  We are not going to make any trouble about
           it. However, regarding the appointment of a new abbot, we have
           submitted the names of five first-rate candidates so please pick
           the new abbot from among these five.  If this is not agreeable, we
           will send up other names to you.  But there is one person whose
           name we will not send tip: the Toba Abbot.  He has a great wish
           to be abbot but he is not knowledgeable or scholarly and will
           not be a good abbot.  He is good in politics, but is not good in
           religion.  If you appoint him as abbot, then we will put away the
           rug on which the monks sit in the Prayer Hall and leave.  To this
           all the monks have taken an oath.
                                                       (Surkhang, interview)

     This defiance placed the Regent in an extraordinarily difficult and poten-
  tially humiliating position.  If he appointed the Toba Abbot, as was his right,
  the monks had already sworn that they would not accept him; and given the
  volatility of monks, they might even try to kill him.  If Reting then took
  action against these monks, there was no telling what kind of support they
  would get from Drepung and Ganden Monasteries.
     Reting turned for assistance to the most famous lama of Sera Mey, Pha-
  bongka.  He was in the midst of giving religious teachings at Tashilhunpo, but
  the Regent sent a special messenger who travelled night and day to ask him
  to return at once.  In Lhasa, the Regent explained the situation and asked
  Phabongka to persuade the monks to accept the Toba Abbot.  Because most
  of them had taken teachings from him, and were thus in a student-teacher
  relationship to him, Phabongka was confident they would listen to him.
     Phabongka invited the more influential monks in Sera Mey to come and
  see him, enjoining them to obey the Regent.  The monks replicd.  "You are
  our 'root' lama and whatever you say we will do. If you say die, we will die.
  However, agreeing to accept the Toba Abbot we will never do."
     Phabongka scolded them, "If you do not listen to what your 'root' lama
  says, you are very bad indeed." The Mey College monks, however, would not
  yield.  They offered Phabongka a gift of money that symbolized their belief
  in him, but Phabongka, angry and frustrated, threw the gift money back
  at them (Surkhang, interview).  The monks, however, refused to acquiesce,
  reiterating that even if they, the higher monks, agreed to accept the Toba
  Abbot, the common monks would never agree.
     Phabongka had to convey the monks' resolve to Reting, who then tried to
  intimidate them.  He ordered blacksmiths in Lhasa to make publicly many
  arm and leg shackles and leaked the rumor that these were for the Sera Mey
  monks who were to be arrested by the government.  After this public display,
  Reting ordered the Mey College leaders to come to his office in Shol, fully
  expecting that they, fearing arrest, would not come.  If this ploy worked, he
  would have a more defensible issue to use against them if he chose to use
  force.  But again he failed.  The monk leaders first asked the common monks
  what they would do if the Regent arrested or killed them.  When they swore
  to sacrifice their lives if necessary in support of their leaders, the Sera Mey
  officials went as ordered to Shol.
     As though giving them a last chance, the Regent asked the Mey College
  officials what they were going to do, implying force might be used against
  them.  The monks stood firm again, saying, "We have nothing to think about
  at all.  If you want, you can put us all in prison but we cannot yield.  Even
  if we wanted to change now, the lower monks will not let it be" (Surkhang,
  interview).  Reting, though furious, now backed down rather than risk a
  violent confrontation with Sera Mey, and appointed one of the five candidates
  originally submitted for the abbacy.
        However, Reting was not content to leave the matter as it stood.  He
  decided to punish the monks of Sera Mey by venting his anger on the old
  Abbot.  He expelled him from the monastery (on the grounds of fomenting
  discord), causing him to lose not only all his rights and income, but also
  his very home in the monastery.  This in turn again embittered the monks
  who further humiliated the Regent by spreading the word that the life of the
  Toba Abbot was not safe if he returned to the monastery.  Unwilling to risk
  this, the Toba Abbot now also had to resign (Surkhang, interview).
  Conclusion
        From the alleged attempt on the life of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama by
  Demo Hutoktu at the turn of the century to the disastrous attempt by Ret-
  ing to assassinate the Regent Taktra in 1947, Tibet experienced a series of
  significant clashes between the Three Seats and the government, and be-
  tween key elements in the Geltigpa religious segment.  This discord, however,
  was typified not by conflict over the ideology that religion must dominate
  in Tibet, but rather over the monks' belief that this meant that the inter-
  ests of the monasteries should reign supreme.  The Three Seats thus had no
  qualms about challenging the government when they felt their interests were
  at stake, for in their view they were more important than Ganden Photrang,
  the government headed by the Dalai Lunas.  During the first half of the
  twentieth century, this perspective dominated the policies of the Three Seats
  and severely constrained the options available to the government.  This, in
  turn, clearly played a major role in the ultimate demise of Ganden Pliotrang
  in Tibet in 1951-1959.
                                         NOTES


       1    Parts of the research data used in this paper were collected through
       grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Smithsonian
       Institution and the Program for Advanced Study and Research in China,
       National Academy of Sciences.  I also want to express my appreciation to
       Tibet House (New Delhi), the Tibet Academy of Social Sciences (Lhasa),
       and the Tibetan Library and Archives (Dharamsala) for their cooperation.
       2   Translation from a copy of the original document provided me by Lob-
       sang Lhalungpa.
       3   Although the past tense is used here, the Three Seat monasteries are
       again functioning both in Tibet and in India, albeit in attenuated form.
       4   Interview with Dung-dkar Rinpoche.
       5   See Goldstein 1964 for a discussion of these dabdo monks.
       6   Khanitsen sometimes contained sub-dorntitory units known as mitsen
       (mi-tshan) which were even more specific with regard to the geographic
       origin of the monks, e.g., a single region within Kham.
       7   These three were the managers of Tsha Khamtsen, Gonggo (Kong-po)
       Khamtsen and Phugang Khamtsen, Loseling's three largest khamtsen.
       8   Interview with the late Zur-khang Sa-dbang-chen-mo (hereafter Sur-
       khang).
       9    It is not clear whether they just wanted to give the estate to someone else                                        
       as some have suggested, or whether they intended to retake administrative
       control over all such estates.
       10   Shan-kha-ba n.d. The third manager, the Gongja, was released with-
       out punishment, most likely because he had not been in office 1910-1913.
       11   Urgyenla, interview; Surkhang, interview; Bell 1946. The Tibetan term
       grwa-pa blug expresses this rushing out of the monks to protest and to intim-
       idate the government.  The verb blug normally denotes a substance bursting
       out of confinement, e.g., water from a hole in a dam.
       12   IOR, L/PS/10/883, telegram from Bell (in Lhasa) to the Government
       of India (Defhi), dated 3rd August, 1921.  Tsarong Dzasa (personal commu-
       nication) contends that there were more than 700 troops in Lhasa at this
       time.  He says the Bodyguard Regiment had 500, and that there were two
       to three other regiments in Lhasa.  This may well be correct, but Bell was
       referring to actual troops on hand, for often a sizable portion of a regiment
       was on leave.  In any case, even 1200 troops was still hardly an overwhelming
       force if a major confrontation developed.
       13   IOR, L/PS/10/883, telegram from Bell (Lhasa) to Government of In-
       dia, dated 3rd September, 1921, cited in telegram from Government of India
       to His Majesty's Government, dated 11th September, 1921.
       14   IOR, L/PS/10/883, telegram of Bcll (Lhasa) to Government of Iii(lia,
       dated 16th September, 1921, cited in telegram from Government of India to
       His Majesty's Government, dated 23rd September, 1921.
       15   IOR, L/PS/10/883, telegram from Bell (Lha-sa) to Government of In-
       dia, dated 16th September, 1921, cited in telegram from Government of India
       to His Majesty's Government, dated 23rd September, 1921.
       16   In Tengyefing's case the entire monastery had been razed to the ground
       in 1913 so that not even a single stone remained.
       17   IOR, L/PS/12/4174, letter from British '1@rade Agent (Gyantse) to Po-
       litical Officer Sikkim, dated 18th November, 1922.  The British refused to
       intervene.
       18   IOR9 L/PS/12/4174 (Pz 1769/24), British Trade Agent (Gyantse) to
       the Political Officer in Sikkim, circa.  March, 1924.
       19   In other words, the Toba Abbot would not get the yield from the estate
       for his first year.